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Limit order books (LOBs) match buyers and sellers in more than half of the world’s
financial markets. This survey highlights the insights that have emerged from the wealth
of empirical and theoretical studies of LOBs. We examine the findings reported by
statistical analyses of historical LOB data and discuss how several LOB models provide
insight into certain aspects of the mechanism. We also illustrate that many such models
poorly resemble real LOBs and that several well-established empirical facts have yet to
be reproduced satisfactorily. Finally, we identify several key unresolved questions about
LOBs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than half of the markets in today’s highly com-
petitive and relentlessly fast-paced financial world now
use a limit order book (LOB) mechanism to facilitate
trade (Ros¸u, 2009). The Helsinki, Hong Kong, Shen-
zhen, Swiss, Tokyo, Toronto, and Vancouver Stock Ex-
changes, together with Euronext and the Australian Se-
curities Exchange, all now operate as pure LOBs (Gu
et al., 2008b; Luckock, 2001); the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), NASDAQ, and the London Stock Ex-
change (LSE) (Cont et al., 2010) all operate a bespoke
hybrid LOB system. Thanks to technological advances,
traders worldwide have real-time access to the current
LOB, providing buyers and sellers alike “the ultimate mi-
croscopic level of description” (Bouchaud et al., 2002).
In an LOB, complicated global phenomena emerge as
a result of the local interactions between many hetero-
geneous agents when the system throughput becomes
sufficiently large. This makes an LOB an example of
a complex system (Mitchell, 2009). The unusually rich,
detailed, and high-quality historic data from LOBs pro-
vides a suitable testing ground for theories about well-
∗ Corresponding author: gouldm@maths.ox.ac.uk
established statistical regularities common to a wide
range of markets (Bouchaud et al., 2009; Cont, 2001;
Farmer and Lillo, 2004), as well as for popular ideas in
the complex systems literature such as universality, scal-
ing, and emergence.
The many practical advantages to understanding LOB
dynamics include: gaining clearer insight into how best
to act in given market situations (Harris and Hasbrouck,
1996); optimal order execution strategies (Obizhaeva
and Wang, 2013); market impact minimization (Eisler
et al., 2012); designing better electronic trading algo-
rithms (Engle et al., 2006); and assessing market stability
(Kirilenko et al., 2011). In this survey, we discuss some
of the key ideas that have emerged from the analysis and
modelling of LOBs in recent years, and we highlight the
strengths and limitations of existing LOB models.
Investigations of LOBs have taken a variety of starting
points, drawing on ideas from economics, physics, math-
ematics, statistics, and psychology. Unsurprisingly, there
is no clear consensus on the best approach. This point
is exemplified by the contrast between the approach nor-
mally taken in the economics literature, in which models
focus on the behaviour of individual traders and present
LOBs as sequential games (Foucault, 1999; Parlour, 1998;
Ros¸u, 2009), with the approach normally taken in the
physics literature, in which order flows are treated as ran-
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2dom and techniques from statistical mechanics are used
to explore the resulting dynamics (Challet and Stinch-
combe, 2001; Cont et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2003). In
the present paper, we discuss developments in both the
economics and physics literatures, and we emphasize as-
pects of LOBs that are most relevant to practitioners.
Several other survey articles focus on particular as-
pects of LOBs. Friedman (2005) reviewed early studies
of double auction style trading, of which LOBs are an ex-
ample. Parlour and Seppi (2008) addressed the economic
and theoretical aspects of LOB trading. Bouchaud et al.
(2009) assessed the current understanding of price forma-
tion in LOBs. Chakraborti et al. (2011a,b) examined the
role of econophysics in understanding LOB behaviour.
In the present survey we note the similarities and dif-
ferences between several empirical studies of historical
LOB data, discuss LOB models from both the physics
and economics literatures, highlight several modelling as-
sumptions that are not well-supported by the empirical
findings, and identify several key unresolved questions.
The remainder of the survey is organized as follows. In
Section II, we give formal definitions related to LOBs and
formulate a mathematically precise description of LOB
trading. In Section III, we discuss some practical aspects
of trading via LOBs and examine the difficulties that
arise in quantifying them. In Section IV, we examine the
important role of empirical studies of LOBs, highlighting
both consensus and disagreement within the literature.
We examine a selection of models in Section V. In Section
VI, we discuss key unresolved problems, and we conclude
in Section VII.
II. A MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION OF AN LOB
In this section, we formulate a precise description of
trading that is common to most LOB markets. Of course,
some individual exchanges and trading platforms operate
slight variations of these core principles. Harris (2003)
provides a comprehensive review of specific details gov-
erning particular exchanges, so we do not reproduce them
here.
A. Preliminaries
Before LOBs grew in popularity, most financial trades
took place in quote-driven marketplaces, in which a hand-
ful of large market makers centralize buy and sell orders
by publishing the prices at which they are willing to buy
and sell the traded asset. The market makers set their
sell price higher than their buy price in order to earn a
profit in exchange for providing liquidity1 to the market,
1 Liquidity is difficult to define formally. Kyle (1985) identified
the three key properties of a liquid market to be tightness (“the
for taking on the risk of acquiring an undesirable inven-
tory position, and for being exposed to possible adverse
selection (i.e., encountering other traders who have bet-
ter information about the value of the asset and who can
therefore make a profit by buying or selling, often repeat-
edly, with the market maker (Parlour and Seppi, 2008)).
The only prices available to other traders who want to
buy or sell the asset are those made public by the market
makers, and the only action available to such traders is
to immediately buy or sell at one of the market makers’
prices. Ticket touts exemplify a quote-driven market in
action.
An LOB is much more flexible because every trader
has the option of posting buy (respectively, sell) orders.
Definition. An order x = (px, ωx, tx) submitted at time
tx with price px and size ωx > 0 (respectively, ωx < 0) is
a commitment to sell (respectively, buy) up to |ωx| units
of the traded asset at a price no less than (respectively,
no greater than) px.
We introduce the vector notation x = (px, ωx, tx) be-
cause it allows explicit calculation of the priority (see
Section III.D) of any order at any time.
For a given LOB, the units of order size and price are
set as follows.
Definition. The lot size σ of an LOB is the smallest
amount of the asset that can be traded within it. All
orders2 must arrive with a size ωx ∈ {±kσ|k = 1, 2, . . .}.
Definition. The tick size pi of an LOB is the smallest
permissible price interval between different orders within
it. All orders must arrive with a price that is specified to
the accuracy of pi.
For example, if pi = $0.00001, then the largest per-
missible order price that is strictly less than $1.00 is
$0.99999, and all orders must be submitted at a price
with exactly 5 decimal places.
Definition. The lot size σ and tick size pi of an LOB
are collectively called its resolution parameters.
When a buy (respectively, sell) order x is submitted,
an LOB’s trade-matching algorithm checks whether it is
possible to match x to some other previously submitted
sell (respectively, buy) order. If so, the matching occurs
immediately. If not, x becomes active, and it remains
cost of turning around a position over a short period of time”),
depth (“the size of an order-flow innovation required to change
prices a given amount”), and resiliency (“the speed with which
prices recover from a random, uninformative shock”).
2 In some markets, there are two lot-size parameters: a minimum
size σ and an increment ε. In such markets, all orders must arrive
with a size ωx ∈ {±(σ + kε)|k = 0, 1, 2, . . .}. For simplicity, we
assume σ = ε.
3active until either it becomes matched to another incom-
ing sell (respectively, buy) order or it is cancelled. Can-
cellation usually occurs because the owner of an order
no longer wishes to offer a trade at the stated price, but
rules governing a market can also lead to the cancellation
of active orders. For example, on the electronic trading
platform Hotspot FX, all active orders are cancelled at
5pm EST each day to prevent an overly large accumu-
lation of active orders over time (Gould et al., 2013b;
Knight-Hotspot, 2013).
It is precisely the active orders in a market that make
up an LOB:
Definition. An LOB L(t) is the set of all active orders
in a market at time t.
The evolution of an LOB L(t) is a ca`dla`g process, i.e.,
for a limit order x = (px, ωx, tx) that becomes active
upon arrival it holds that x ∈ L(tx), x /∈ limt′↑tx L(t′).
The active orders in an LOB L(t) can be partitioned into
the set of active buy orders B(t), for which ωx < 0, and
the set of active sell orders A(t), for which ωx > 0. An
LOB can then be considered as a set of queues, each of
which consists of active buy or sell orders at a specified
price.
The terms bid price, ask price, mid price, and bid-ask
spread are common to much of the finance literature and
can be made specific in the context of an LOB:
Definition. The bid price at time t is the highest stated
price among active buy orders at time t,
b(t) := max
x∈B(t)
px. (1)
The ask price at time t is the lowest stated price among
active sell orders at time t,
a(t) := min
x∈A(t)
px. (2)
Definition. The bid-ask spread at time t is s(t) :=
a(t)− b(t).
Definition. The mid price at time t is m(t) :=
[a(t) + b(t)] /2.
In an LOB, b(t) is the highest price at which it is imme-
diately possible to sell at least the lot size of the traded
asset at time t, and a(t) is the lowest price at which it
is immediately possible to buy at least the lot size of the
traded asset at time t. It is sometimes helpful to consider
prices relative to b(t) and a(t).3
3 Many different naming and sign conventions are used by different
authors to describe slightly different definitions of relative price.
We introduce an explicit distinction between bid-relative price
and ask-relative price to avoid potential confusion.
Definition. For a given price p, the bid-relative price
is δb(p) := b(t)− p and the ask-relative price is δa(p) :=
p− a(t).
Observe the difference in signs between the two defi-
nitions: δb(p) measures how much smaller p is than b(t),
and δa(p) measures how much larger p is than a(t).
It is often desirable to compare orders on the bid side
and the ask side of an LOB. In these cases, the concept
of a single relative price of an order is useful.
Definition. For a given order x = (px, ωx, tx), the rela-
tive price of the order is
δx :=
{
δb(px), if the order is a buy order,
δa(px), if the order is a sell order.
(3)
Most traders assess the state of L(t) via the depth pro-
file or relative depth profile.
Definition. The bid-side depth available at price p and
at time t is
nb(p, t) :=
∑
{x∈B(t)|px=p}
ωx. (4)
The ask-side depth available at price p and at time t,
denoted na(p, t), is defined similarly using A(t).
The depth available is often stated in multiples of the
lot size. Because ωx < 0 for buy orders and ωx > 0 for
sell orders, it follows that nb(p, t) ≤ 0 and na(p, t) ≥ 0
for all prices p.
Definition. The bid-side depth profile at time t is the
set of all ordered pairs
(
p, nb (p, t)
)
. The ask-side depth
profile at time t is the set of all ordered pairs (p, na (p, t)).
Definition. The mean bid-side depth available at price
p between times t1 and t2 is
nb(p, t1, t2) :=
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
nb(p, t)dt. (5)
The mean ask-side depth available at price p between
times t1 and t2, denoted n
a(p, t1, t2), is defined similarly
using the ask-side depth available.
Because b(t) and a(t) vary, it is rarely illuminating to
consider the depth available at a specific price over time.
However, relative pricing provides a useful alternative.
Definition. The bid-side depth available at relative
price p and at time t is
N b(p, t) :=
∑
{x∈B(t)|δx=p}
ωx. (6)
The ask-side depth available at relative price p and at
time t, denoted Na(p, t), is defined similarly using A(t).
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FIG. 1 Schematic of an LOB.
Definition. The bid-side relative depth profile at time t
is the set of all ordered pairs
(
p,N b (p, t)
)
. The ask-side
relative depth profile at time t is the set of all ordered
pairs (p,Na (p, t)).
Definition. The mean bid-side depth available at rela-
tive price p between times t1 and t2 is
N
b
(p, t1, t2) :=
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
N b(p, t)dt. (7)
The mean ask-side depth available at relative price p be-
tween times t1 and t2, denoted N
a
(p, t1, t2), is defined
similarly using the ask-side relative depth available.
Definition. The mean bid-side relative depth profile
between times t1 and t2 is the set of all ordered pairs
(p,N
b
(p, t1, t2)). The mean ask-side relative depth pro-
file between times t1 and t2 is the set of all ordered pairs
(p,N
a
(p, t1, t2)).
Relative depth profiles provide no information about
the absolute prices at which trades occur, nor do they
contain information about the bid-ask spread or mid
price. However, several studies have concluded that or-
der arrival rates depend on relative prices rather than ac-
tual prices (see, e.g., Biais et al. (1995); Bouchaud et al.
(2002); Potters and Bouchaud (2003); Zovko and Farmer
(2002)), so it is common to consider the relative depth
profiles and b(t) and a(t) simultaneously.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of an LOB at some instant
in time, illustrating the definitions in this section. The
horizontal lines within the blocks at each price level de-
note how the depth available at that price is composed
of different active orders.
Time series of prices arise often during the study of
LOBs. As discussed in Section IV.G, it is a recurring
theme that the behaviour of such a time series depends
significantly on how it is sampled. For example, con-
sider the time series m(t1), . . . ,m(tn), for some times
t1, . . . , tn.
• When the ti are spaced regularly in time, with τ
seconds between successive samplings, such a time
series is said to be sampled on a τ -second timescale.
• When the ti are chosen to correspond to arrivals
of orders, the ti may be spaced irregularly in time.
Such a time series is said to be sampled on an event-
by-event timescale.
• When the ti are chosen to correspond to trades (i.e.,
matchings in an LOB), the ti may also be spaced
irregularly in time. Such a time series is said to be
sampled on a trade-by-trade timescale.
B. Orders: the building blocks of an LOB
The actions of traders in an LOB can be expressed
solely in terms of the submission or cancellation of orders
of the lot size. For example, a trader who immediately
sells 4σ units of the traded asset in the LOB displayed
in Figure 2 can be considered as submitting 2 sell orders
of size σ at the price $1.50, 1 sell order of size σ at the
price $1.49, and 1 sell order of size σ at the price $1.48.
Similarly, a trader who posts a sell order of size 4σ at the
price $1.55 can be considered as submitting 4 sell orders
of size σ at a price of $1.55 each.
Almost all of the published literature on LOBs adopts
the following terminology. Orders that result in an imme-
diate matching upon submission are known as market or-
ders. Orders that do not, instead becoming active orders,
are known as limit orders.4 However, it is important to
recognize that this terminology is used only to emphasize
whether an incoming order triggers an immediate match-
ing or not. There is no fundamental difference between
a limit order and a market order.
Some trading platforms allow traders to specify that
they wish to submit a buy (respectively, sell) market or-
der without explicitly specifying a price. Instead, such a
trader specifies only a size, and the matching algorithm
sets the price of the order appropriately to initiate the
required matching.
C. Price changes in LOBs
In LOBs, the rules that govern matchings dictate how
prices evolve through time. Consider a buy (respectively,
4 Some practitioners use the terms aggressive orders and resting
orders, respectively, but this terminology is far less common in
the published literature.
5sell) order x = (px, ωx, tx) that arrives immediately after
time t.
• If px ≤ b(t) (respectively, px ≥ a(t)), then x is a
limit order that becomes active upon arrival. It
does not cause b(t) or a(t) to change.
• If b(t) < px < a(t), then x is a limit order that be-
comes active upon arrival. It causes b(t) to increase
(respectively, a(t) to decrease) to px at time tx.
• If px ≥ a(t) (respectively, px ≤ b(t)), then x is a
market order that immediately matches to one or
more active sell (respectively, buy) orders upon ar-
rival. Whenever such a matching occurs, it does
so at the price of the active order, which is not
necessarily equal to the price of the incoming or-
der. Whether or not such a matching causes a(t)
(respectively, b(t)) to change at time tx depends on
na(a(t), t) (respectively, nb(b(t), t)) and ωx. In par-
ticular, the new bid price b(tx) immediately after
the arrival of a sell market order x is
max(px, q), where q = arg max
k′
b(t)∑
k=k′
∣∣nb(k, t)∣∣ > ωx. (8)
Similarly, the new ask price a(tx) immediately after
the arrival of a buy market order x is
min(px, q), where q = arg min
k′
k′∑
k=a(t)
na(k, t) > |ωx| .
(9)
Put another way, the incoming order x matches to the
highest priority active order y of opposite type. If
|ωx| > |ωy|, then any residue size of x is considered
for matching to the next highest priority active order
of opposite type, and so on until either there are no fur-
ther active orders with prices that make them eligible for
matching, in which case the residue of x becomes active
at the price px, or x is fully matched. The new bid (re-
spectively, ask) price is then equal to the price of the
highest priority active buy (respectively, sell) order after
the matching occurs.
Table I lists several possible market events that could
occur to the LOB displayed in Figure 2 and the resulting
values of b(tx), a(tx),m(tx), and s(tx) that they would
cause.
In the financial literature, price changes are commonly
studied via returns.
Definition. The bid-price return between times t1 and
t2 is R
b(t1, t2) := (b(t2) − b(t1))/b(t1). The ask-price
return between times t1 and t2, denoted R
a(t1, t2), and
the mid-price return between times t1 and t2, denoted
Rm(t1, t2), are defined similarly.
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FIG. 2 An example LOB.
Values after arrival (USD)
Arriving order x b(tx) a(tx) m(tx) s(tx)
Initial Values 1.50 1.53 1.515 0.03
($1.48,−3σ, tx) 1.50 1.53 1.515 0.03
($1.51,−3σ, tx) 1.51 1.53 1.52 0.02
($1.55,−3σ, tx) 1.50 1.54 1.52 0.04
($1.55,−5σ, tx) 1.50 1.55 1.525 0.05
($1.54, 4σ, tx) 1.50 1.53 1.515 0.03
($1.52, 4σ, tx) 1.50 1.52 1.51 0.02
($1.47, 4σ, tx) 1.48 1.53 1.505 0.05
($1.50, 4σ, tx) 1.49 1.50 1.495 0.01
TABLE I How each order arrival would affect prices in the
LOB displayed in Figure 2.
Definition. The bid-price logarithmic return between
times t1 and t2 is r
b(t1, t2) := log (b(t2)/b(t1)). The ask-
price logarithmic return between times t1 and t2, denoted
ra(t1, t2), and the mid-price logarithmic return between
times t1 and t2, denoted r
m(t1, t2), are defined similarly.
D. The economic benefits of LOBs
In an LOB, traders are able to choose between submit-
ting limit orders and submitting market orders. Limit
orders stand a chance of matching at better prices than
do market orders, but they also run the risk of never
being matched. Conversely, market orders never match
at prices better than b(t) and a(t), but they do not face
the inherent uncertainty associated with limit orders. An
LOB’s bid-ask spread s(t) can be considered as a measure
of how highly the market values the immediacy and cer-
tainty associated with market orders versus the waiting
and uncertainty associated with limit orders. Foucault
et al. (2005) argued that the popularity of LOBs was
due in part to their ability to allow some traders to de-
mand immediacy, while simultaneously allowing others
to supply it to those who later require it. He conjectured
that arbitrageurs, technical traders, and indexers were
most likely to place market orders (due to the fast-paced
nature of their work) and that portfolio managers were
most likely to place limit orders (because their strategies
6are generally more focused on the long term). In reality,
most traders use a combination of both limit orders and
market orders; they select their actions for each situa-
tion based on their individual needs at that time (Anand
et al., 2005).
Glosten (1994) argued that LOBs are an effective way
for patient traders to provide liquidity to less patient
traders, even when liquidity is scarce. Luckock (2003)
concluded that the volume traded in an LOB would al-
ways exceed that of a Walrasian market,5 given the same
underlying supply and demand.
Copeland and Galai (1983) noted that a limit order
can be considered as a derivative contract written to the
whole market, via which the order’s owner offers to buy
or sell the specified quantity of the asset at the specified
price to any trader wishing to accept. For example, a
trader submits a sell limit order x = (px, ωx, tx) is of-
fering the entire market a call option to buy ωx units
of the asset at price px for as long as the order remains
active. Traders offer such derivative contracts — i.e.,
submit limit orders — in the hope that they will be able
to trade at better prices than if they simply submitted
market orders. However, whether or not such a contract
will be accepted by another trader (i.e., whether or not
the limit order will eventually become matched) is un-
certain.
III. CHALLENGES OF STUDYING LOBS
In this section, we discuss some of the challenges that
LOBs present researchers. In particular, we discuss tech-
nical issues associated with the study of empirical LOB
data and present several challenges inherent in modelling
LOBs.
A. Perfect rationality versus zero intelligence
Constructing a useful model of an LOB entails mak-
ing several assumptions. One such assumption concerns
the reason that order flows exist at all. Much of the
economics literature assumes that orders are submitted
because perfectly rational traders attempt to maximize
their “utility” by making trades in markets driven by
“information” (Parlour and Seppi, 2008). However, this
assumption has come under scrutiny because utility max-
imisation is often inconsistent with direct observations of
individual behaviour (Gode and Sunder, 1993; Kahne-
man and Tversky, 2000; Lux and Westerhoff, 2009).
5 A Walrasian market is a market in which all traders send their
desired buy or sell orders to a specialist, who then determines the
market value of the asset by selecting the price that maximises
the volume of trade.
At the other extreme lies the zero-intelligence ap-
proach, in which aggregated order flows are assumed to
be governed by specified stochastic processes whose rate
parameters are conditional on other variables such as L(t)
(Cont et al., 2010; Daniels et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2003).
In this way, order flow can be regarded as a consequence
of traders blindly following a set of rules without strate-
gic considerations. Much like perfect rationality, zero-
intelligence assumptions are extreme simplifications that
are inconsistent with empirical observations. However,
zero intelligence has the appeal of leading to easily quan-
tifiable models that can yield falsifiable predictions with-
out the need for auxiliary assumptions. It is, therefore,
a useful starting point for building models.6
Between the two extremes of perfect rationality and
zero intelligence lies a broad range of other approaches
that make weaker assumptions about traders’ behaviour
and order flows, at the cost of resulting in models that
are more difficult to study. Many such models rely ex-
clusively on Monte Carlo simulation to produce output.
Although such simulations still motivate interesting ob-
servations, it is often difficult to trace exactly how specific
model outputs are affected by input parameters.
B. State-space complexity
It is a well-established empirical fact that current or-
der flows depend on both L(t) and on recent order flows
(Biais et al., 1995; Ellul et al., 2003; Hall and Hautsch,
2006; Hollifield et al., 2004; Lo and Sapp, 2010; Sand˚as,
2001). From a perfect-rationality perspective, this can be
seen as traders reacting to the changing state of a market;
from a zero-intelligence perspective, it can be considered
as order flow rates depending on L(t) and on their recent
history. Either way, a key task is to uncover the structure
of such conditional behaviour, either to understand what
information traders evaluate when making decisions or
to quantify the conditional structure of order flows.
A problem with studying conditional behaviour is that
the state space of an LOB is huge: if there are P different
choices for price in a given LOB, then the state space of
the current depth profile alone, expressed in units of the
lot size σ, is ZP . This makes it very difficult to investigate
conditional dependences, as the number of variables is so
large. Therefore, a key modelling task is to find a way to
simplify the evolving, high-dimensional state space, while
retaining an LOB’s important features. Some authors
have proposed ways to reduce dimensionality (see, e.g.,
6 In Section V, we explore how some authors have attempted to
quantify perfect rationality for modelling purposes and discuss
the often highly unrealistic assumptions that such formulations
require to be tested empirically. A detailed treatment can be
found in Foucault et al. (2005).
7Cont and de Larrard (2011); Eliezer and Kogan (1998);
Smith et al. (2003)), but there is no consensus about
a simplified state space upon which very general LOB
models can be constructed.
C. Feedback and coupling
In addition to traders’ actions depending on L(t), the
state of L(t) also clearly depends on traders’ actions.
These mutual dependences induce feedback between L(t)
and trader behaviour. Also, as described in Section II.B,
b(t) determines the boundary condition for sell limit or-
der placement because any sell order placed at or below
b(t) at least partially matches immediately. A similar role
is played by a(t) for buy orders. Therefore, order flow cre-
ates a strong coupling between b(t) and a(t). Smith et al.
(2003) observed how such coupling makes LOB modelling
a difficult problem.
D. Priority
As shown in Figure 1, several active orders can have
the same price at a given time. Much like priority is given
to active orders with the best (i.e., highest buy or lowest
sell) price, LOBs also employ a priority system for active
orders within each individual price level.
By far the most common priority mechanism currently
used is price-time. That is, for active buy (respectively,
sell) orders, priority is given to the active orders with the
highest (respectively, lowest) price, and ties are broken
by selecting the active order with the earliest submis-
sion time tx. Price-time priority is an effective way to
encourage traders to place limit orders (Parlour, 1998).
Without a priority mechanism based on time, there is no
incentive for traders to show their hand by submitting
limit orders earlier than is absolutely necessary.
Another priority mechanism, commonly used in fu-
tures markets, is pro-rata (Field and Large, 2008). Under
this mechanism, when a tie occurs at a given price, each
relevant active order receives a share of the matching
proportional to the fraction of the depth available that
it represents at that price. For example, if a buy market
order of size 3σ arrived at the LOB displayed in Figure
3, then σ of it would match to active order x1 and 2σ
of it would match to active order x2, because they corre-
spond, respectively, to 1/3 and 2/3 of the depth available
at a(t). Traders in pro-rata priority LOBs are faced with
the substantial difficulty of optimally selecting limit or-
der sizes, because posting limit orders with larger sizes
than the quantity that is really desired for trade becomes
a viable strategy to gain priority.
Another alternative priority mechanism is price-size,
in which ties are broken by selecting the active order of
largest size among those at the best price. Until recently,
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FIG. 3 An LOB with pro-rata priority.
no major exchanges used this priority mechanism. How-
ever, in October 2010, the first price-size trading plat-
form, NASDAQ OMX PSX, was launched (NADSAQ,
2010). Some exchanges also allow traders to specify a
minimum match size when submitting orders. Orders
with a size smaller than this are not considered for match-
ing to such orders. This is similar to a price-size priority
mechanism: small active orders are often bypassed, ef-
fectively giving higher priority to larger orders.
Different priority mechanisms encourage traders to be-
have in different ways. Price-time priority encourages
traders to submit limit orders early; price-size and pro-
rata priority reward traders for placing large limit or-
ders and thus for providing greater liquidity to the mar-
ket. Traders’ behaviour is closely related to the priority
mechanism used, so LOB models need to take priority
mechanisms into account when considering order flow.
Furthermore, priority plays a pivotal role in models that
attempt to track specific orders.
E. Incomplete sampling and hidden liquidity
An LOB L(t) reflects only the subset of trading inten-
tions that traders have announced up to time t. However,
the fact that no traders have submitted a limit order at
a given price does not imply that none of them want to
trade at this price, because they could be keeping their
intentions private by submitting orders only when ab-
solutely necessary (To´th et al., 2011). Bouchaud et al.
(2009) noted that a typical snapshot of L(t) at a given
time is often very sparse, containing few active orders.
However, this is not an indication that few people wish
to trade; it is merely an indication that they have not yet
announced any intention to do so. Indeed, some traders
choose to submit only market orders and do not submit
limit orders at all.7
7 Arbitrageurs provide a key example, because their strategies de-
pend on simultaneously buying and selling in an attempt to make
instant profit. Limit orders are of little use to them because it is
uncertain when (if ever) they will be matched.
81. Hidden orders
Many exchanges allow traders to conceal the extent
of their intentions to trade, often at the cost of paying
some penalty in terms of priority or price. For exam-
ple, many exchanges allow traders to submit iceberg or-
ders (also known as hidden-size orders), a type of limit
order that specifies not only a total size and price but
also a visible size. Other traders only see the visible
size. Rules regarding the treatment of the hidden quan-
tity vary greatly from one exchange to another. In some
cases, once a quantity of at least the visible size matches
to an incoming market order, another quantity equal to
the visible size becomes visible. This quantity has prior-
ity equal to that of a standard limit order placed at this
price at this time. This sort of iceberg order is similar to
a trader first submitting a limit order, then watching the
market carefully and submitting a new limit order at the
same price and size at the exact moment that the previ-
ous limit order matches to an incoming market order. A
trader acting in this way is sometimes deemed to be con-
structing a synthetic iceberg order. The only difference
between a synthetic iceberg order and a genuine iceberg
order occurs when a market order with a size larger than
the (visible) depth available at the best price arrives. In
this situation, the market order matches to any visible
portions of active orders at the best price according to
the usual priority rules, then matches to a portion of
any hidden depth available at this price. By contrast,
if a trader submits a small but entirely visible duplicate
limit order immediately after the previous order matches,
then a large incoming market order would match only to
the active orders that existed when it arrived. The rest
of the incoming market order would instead match to the
active orders at the next best price.
Some exchanges have an alternative structure for ice-
berg orders. Whenever a quantity equal to at least the
visible size of an iceberg order matches to an incoming
market order, the rest of the order (i.e., the portion of
the hidden component that does not match to the same
incoming market order) is cancelled. Iceberg orders can
thereby match incoming market orders of a larger size
than is initially apparent, but otherwise they behave like
any other order. This is the system currently used by the
Reuters trading platform (Thomson-Reuters, 2011).
Some other trading platforms allow entirely hidden
limit orders. These orders are given priority behind both
entirely visible active orders at their price and the visi-
ble portion of iceberg orders at their price, but they give
traders the ability to submit limit orders without reveal-
ing any information whatsoever to the market.
2. Dark pools
Recently, there has been an increase in the popularity
of so-called dark pools (see, e.g., Carrie (2006); Hender-
shott and Jones (2005)). The matching rules govern-
ing trade in dark pools vary greatly from one exchange
to another (Mittal, 2008). Some dark pools are essen-
tially LOBs in which all active orders are entirely hidden.
Other dark pools do not allow traders to specify prices
for their orders. Instead, traders submit orders describ-
ing their desired quantity and whether they wish to buy
or sell, and the dark pool holds all such requests in an en-
tirely hidden, time-priority queue until they are matched
to orders of the opposite type. Upon matching, trades
occur either at the mid-price m(t) of another specified
standard (i.e., non-dark) LOB for the same asset or at a
price that is later negotiated by the two traders involved.
3. Displayed liquidity
Even in LOBs with no hidden liquidity, traders are
not always able to view the set of all active orders in real
time. Many exchanges display only active orders that lie
within a certain range of relative prices. Furthermore,
some electronic trading platforms only transmit updates
to L(t) at a specific frequency, so all activity that has
taken place since the most recent refresh signal is invisible
to traders.
F. Volatility
Loosely speaking, volatility is a measure of the vari-
ability of returns of a traded asset (Barndorff-Nielsen and
Shephard, 2010). The volatility of an asset provides some
indication of how risky it is. All else held equal, an as-
set with higher volatility is expected to undergo larger
price changes over a given time interval than an asset
with lower volatility. For traders who wish to manage
their risk exposure, volatility is an important consider-
ation when deciding the assets in which to invest, and
therefore often forms the basis of optimal portfolio con-
struction (Rebonato, 2004).
Many different measures of volatility exist, and the ex-
act form of volatility studied in a given situation depends
on the type of available data and the desired purpose of
the calculation (Shephard, 2005). Even when estimated
on the same data, different measures of volatility some-
times exhibit different properties. For example, differ-
ent measures of volatility follow different intra-day pat-
terns in a wide range of different markets (see Cont et al.
(2011) and references therein). Therefore, many empiri-
cal studies report results using several different measures
of volatility.
In an LOB, traders have access to far more information
9than just b(t) and a(t). In particular, information such as
nb(b(t), t) and na(a(t), t) is useful to predict how prices
are likely to change (Biais et al., 1995; Bortoli et al., 2006;
Ellul et al., 2003; Hall and Hautsch, 2006; Lo and Sapp,
2010). As discussed in Section IV.E, several empirical
studies from a wide range of LOBs have reported links
between volatility and other LOB properties. However,
to our knowledge, there does not yet exist an estimate of
volatility that takes the full state of L(t) into account. In-
stead, most estimates of volatility consider only changes
in price series such as b(t), a(t), and m(t). For further
discussion of practical issues regarding volatility estima-
tion, see Liu et al. (1999).
1. Model-free estimates of volatility
There is an extensive literature on the use of price
series data to perform direct, model-free estimates of
volatility (see, e.g., Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2011); Andersen
and Todorov (2010); Bandi and Russell (2006); Zhou
(1996)). In this section, we discuss three methods for
performing such estimates.
Definition. Given the bid-price series
b(t1), b(t2), . . . , b(tn) sampled at regularly spaced times,
the bid-price realized volatility is vb(t1, t2, . . . , tn) :=
st. dev.
({
rb(ti, ti+1) | i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1
})
. The ask-
price realized volatility, denoted va(t1, t2, . . . , tn),
and the mid-price realized volatility, denoted
vm(t1, t2, . . . , tn), are defined similarly.
Realized volatility depends on the frequency at which
price series are sampled. It is a useful measure for com-
paring the variability of return series sampled with the
same frequency, but it is not appropriate to compare the
realized volatility of a once-daily price series for one stock
to a once-hourly price series for another.
Definition. Given the bid-price series
b(t1), b(t2), . . . , b(tn) sampled at the times at which
n consecutive sell market orders arrive, the bid-price
realized volatility per trade is V b(t1, t2, . . . , tn) :=
st. dev.
({
rb(ti, ti+1) | i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1
})
. The
ask-price realized volatility per trade, denoted
V a(t1, t2, . . . , tn), is defined similarly using n con-
secutive buy market order arrival times. The mid-price
realized volatility per trade, denoted V m(t1, t2, . . . , tn),
is defined similarly using n consecutive market order
arrival times (irrespective of whether they are buy or sell
market orders).
Realized volatility per trade is useful for comparing
how prices vary on a trade-by-trade basis.
Definition. For a given trading day D, the
bid-price intra-day volatility is ρb(D) :=
log (maxt∈D b(t)/mint∈D b(t)). The ask-price intra-day
volatility, denoted ρa(D), and the mid-price intra-day
volatility, denoted ρm(D), are defined similarly.
Intra-day volatility is useful for estimating the prob-
ability of very large price changes in a given day. It is
particularly important for day traders, who unwind their
trading positions before the end of each trading day.
2. Model-based estimates of volatility
A difficulty that arises when estimating any measure
of volatility in an LOB is that many traders submit then
immediately cancel limit orders. This can occur for a
variety of reasons, but it is often the result of electronic
trading algorithms searching for hidden liquidity. Such
behaviour can cause b(t) and a(t) to fluctuate rapidly
without any trades occurring, and it can be considered
as microstructure noise rather than a meaningful change
in price. One way to address this problem is to assume
that the observed data is governed by a model from which
an estimate of volatility that is absent of microstructure
noise can be derived. The parameters of the model are
then estimated from the data, and the volatility esti-
mate is derived explicitly from the model. However, a
drawback of this method is that it depends heavily on
the model, and models that poorly mimic important as-
pects of the trading process may therefore give misleading
volatility estimates.
G. Resolution parameters
Values of σ and pi vary greatly from between differ-
ent trading platforms. Expensive stocks are often traded
with σ = 1 share; cheaper shares are often traded with
σ  1 share. In foreign exchange (FX) markets, some
trading platforms use values as large as σ = 1 million
units of the base currency, whereas others use values as
small as σ = 0.01 units of the base currency.8 In eq-
uity markets, pi is often 0.01% of the stock’s mid price
m(t), rounded to the nearest power of 10. For example,
m(t) for Apple Inc. fluctuated between approximately
$400 and approximately $700 in 2012, during which time
it traded with pi = $0.01. A given currency pair is of-
ten traded with different values of pi on different trading
platforms. For example, on the electronic trading plat-
form Hotspot FX, pi = $0.00001 for the GBP/USD LOB
and pi = 0.001 for the USD/JPY LOB, whereas on the
8 In FX markets, an XXX/YYY LOB matches exchanges of the
base currency XXX to the counter currency YYY. A price in
an XXX/YYY LOB denotes how many units of currency YYY
are exchanged for a single unit of currency XXX. For example, a
trade at the price $1.52342 in a GBP/USD market corresponds
to 1 pound sterling being exchanged for 1.52342 US dollars.
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electronic trading platform EBS, pi = $0.00005 for the
GBP/USD LOB and pi = 0.005 for the USD/JPY LOB
(EBS, 2012; Hotspot, 2013).
It is a recurring theme in the literature (see, e.g., Bi-
ais et al. (1995); Foucault et al. (2005); Seppi (1997);
Smith et al. (2003)) that an LOB’s resolution parame-
ters σ and pi greatly affect trade within it. An LOB’s
lot size σ dictates the smallest permissible order size,
so any trader who wishes to trade in quantities smaller
than σ is unable to do so. Furthermore, as we discuss in
Section IV.F, traders who wish to submit large market
orders often break them into smaller chunks to minimize
their market impact. The size of σ controls the smallest
permissible size of such chunks and therefore directly af-
fects traders who implement such a strategy. An LOB’s
tick size pi dictates how much more expensive it is for a
trader to gain the priority (see Section III.D) associated
with choosing a higher (respectively, lower) price for a
buy (respectively, sell) order (Parlour and Seppi, 2008).
In markets where pi is extremely small, there is little rea-
son for a trader to submit a buy (respectively, sell) limit
order at a price p where there are already other active or-
ders. Instead, he or she can gain priority over such active
orders very cheaply, by choosing the price p+ pi (respec-
tively, p − pi) for the limit order. Such a setup leads to
LOBs that undergo extremely frequent changes in b(t)
and a(t) due to the small depths available. This makes it
difficult for other traders to monitor the state of the mar-
ket in real time. In September 2012, the electronic FX
trading platform EBS increased the size of pi for most of
its currency pairs’ LOBs. Their reason for doing so was
“to help thicken top of book price points, increase the
cost of top of book price discovery and improve match-
ing execution in terms of percent fill amounts” (EBS,
2012).
H. Bilateral trade agreements
On some exchanges, each trader maintains a block-list
of other traders with whom he or she is unwilling to trade.
A trade can only occur between traders θi and θj if θi
does not appears on θj ’s block-list and vice-versa. The
exchange shows each trader θi a personalized LOB that
contains only the active orders owned by traders with
whom it is possible for θi to trade. When a trader sub-
mits a market order, it can only match to active orders
in their personalized LOB, bypassing any higher priority
active orders from traders on their block-list.
On exchanges that use such bilateral trade agreements,
it is possible for a buy (respectively, sell) market order
to bypass all active orders at the globally lowest (respec-
tively, highest) price available in L(t) and to match to an
active order with a strictly higher (respectively, lower)
price. Furthermore, given two traders θi and θj who do
not have a bilateral trade agreement, it is possible for
L(t) to simultaneously contain both an active buy or-
der x = (px, ωx, tx) owned by θi and an active sell order
y = (py, ωy, ty) owned by θj , with py ≤ px, without a
matching occurring. Therefore, it is possible for such
markets to have a negative bid-ask spread.
These factors make modelling of specific matchings and
of the evolution of L(t) a very difficult task in LOBs that
operate with bilateral trade agreements. (Gould et al.,
2013a,b) presents a full discussion of these issues, so we
do not consider such LOBs further.
I. Opening and closing auctions
Many exchanges suspend standard limit order trading
at the beginning and end of the trading day and instead
use an auction system to match orders. For example, the
LSE’s flagship order book SETS (SETS, 2011) has three
distinct trading phases in each trading day. Between
08:00 and 16:30, the standard LOB mechanism is used
in a period known as continuous trading. Between 07:50
and 08:00, a 10-minute opening auction takes place. Be-
tween 16:30 and 16:35, a 5-minute closing auction takes
place. During both auctions, all traders can view and
place orders as usual, but no orders are matched. Due to
the absence of matchings, the highest price among buy
orders can exceed the lowest price among sell orders. All
orders are stored until the opening auction ends. At this
time, for each price p at which there is non-zero depth
available, the trade matching algorithm calculates the
total volume Cp of trades that could occur by matching
buy orders with a price greater than or equal to p to
sell orders with a price less than or equal to p. It then
calculates the uncrossing price
pˆ = arg max
p
Cp. (10)
In contrast to standard LOB trading, all trades take place
at the same uncrossing price pˆ. Given pˆ, if there is a
smaller depth available for sale than there is for purchase
(or vice versa), ties are broken using time priority.
Throughout the opening auction, all traders can see
what the value of pˆ would be if the auction were to end
at that moment. This allows all traders to observe the
discovery of the price without any matchings taking place
until the process is complete. Such a price-discovery pro-
cess is common to many markets.9
9 Biais et al. (1999) performed a formal hypothesis test on price-
discovery data from the Paris Bourse. Working at the 2.5% level,
they did not reject the null hypothesis that traders’ conditional
expectations of asset price approached the market value of the
asset during the final 9 minutes of the price-discovery process.
However, they found that traders’ actions were not significantly
different from noise during the early part of the price-discovery
process.
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J. Statistical issues
As we discuss in Section IV, many authors have re-
ported statistical regularities in LOB data from a wide
variety of different markets. However, such statistical
analysis is fraught with difficulties because assumptions
such as independence and stationarity, which are often re-
quired to ensure consistency of estimation, are rarely sat-
isfied by LOB data (Cont, 2005; Mantegna and Stanley,
1999). Furthermore, suboptimal estimators have been
employed commonly in the literature, and have often pro-
duced estimates with large variance or bias. For example,
there are questions about the validity of many reported
power laws throughout the scientific literature (Clauset
et al., 2009; Stumpf and Porter, 2012). Many authors use
ordinary least-squares regression on a log-log plot to es-
timate power-law exponents from LOB data, yet Clauset
et al. (2009) showed that this method produces signifi-
cant systematic estimation errors. They also showed that
it is inappropriate to use power-law estimators designed
for continuous data on discrete data (or vice versa), yet
many LOB studies do precisely this.
In this section, we list some of the pitfalls of statisti-
cal estimation using LOB data and suggest some useful
estimators for data analysis. However, these techniques
are not “one-size-fits-all” approaches, and it is important
to verify the necessary assumptions before implementing
them on a given data set.
1. Power laws
Several LOB properties are reported to have power-law
tails:
Definition. A random variable Z is said to have a
power-law tail with exponent α if there exists some α ∈ R
such that fZ(z) ∼ O (z−α) as z →∞.
If there exists a zmin > 0 such that fZ(z) is pro-
portional to z−α for all z ≥ zmin, then clearly Z has
a power-law tail.10 When attempting to fit power-law
tails to empirical observations, it is often assumed that
such a zmin exists (and resides within the range of the
data), because the existence of such a zmin allows sim-
ple, closed-form expressions to be derived. Under this
assumption, Clauset et al. (2009) provided a comprehen-
sive algorithm for consistent estimation of α and zmin via
maximum likelihood techniques, as well as for testing the
hypothesis that the data really does follow a power law
for z ≥ zmin. Several other consistent estimation proce-
dures also exist (see, e.g., Hill (1975); Mu et al. (2009)),
10 This is not the only probability density function that has a power-
law tail, but it is the most common in the literature.
but no single estimator has emerged as the best to adopt
in all situations. Therefore, some empirical studies report
results using several different estimators and then draw
inference based on the whole set of results. However,
as Mu et al. (2009) highlighted, different estimators of-
ten produce vastly different estimates of α, making such
inference difficult.
2. Long-memory processes
As we discuss in Section IV.G, several time series re-
lated to LOBs have been reported to exhibit long mem-
ory. Intuitively, a time series has long memory if values
from the present are correlated with values in the distant
future. The study of long-memory processes involves con-
siderable challenges, and caution is needed when applying
standard statistical techniques to data with long mem-
ory (Beran, 1994). For example, the effective sample size
of a long memory process is significantly smaller than
the number of data points, so statistical estimators often
converge at an extremely slow rate (Farmer and Lillo,
2004). Furthermore, the correlation structure can cause
such estimators to converge to arbitrary values (Beran,
1994).
In this section, we discuss several practical challenges
of estimating long memory. We denote by X a real-
valued, second-order stationary11 time series of length k,
X = X(t1), X(t2), . . . , X(tk).
One way to define long memory is via the asymptotic
behaviour of the autocorrelation function.
Definition. The autocorrelation function A of a time
series X is given by
AX (l) :=
1
k − l
k−l∑
i=1
(X(ti)− 〈X〉) (X(ti+l)− 〈X〉) ,
(11)
where 〈X〉 = 1k
∑k
i=1X(ti) is the mean of the series.
Definition. A time series X is said to exhibit long
memory if there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) such that AX
decays like a power law,
AX(l) ∼ O
(
l−α
)
, as l→∞. (12)
The exponent α describes the strength of the long
memory: the smaller the value of α, the stronger the
long-range autocorrelations (Lillo and Farmer, 2004).
Because of the slow decay of the autocorrelation function
in a long-memory process, present values of the series can
11 A time series is second-order stationary if its first and second
moments are finite and do not vary with time. For a discussion
of issues regarding stationarity in financial time series, see Taylor
(2008).
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have a significant effect on its values in the distant future.
It is a recurring mistake in the literature that if X has
long memory, its unconditional distribution must exhibit
heavy tails. However, Preis et al. (2006, 2007) showed
that such an implication does not hold in general.
A key difficulty when using Equation (12) to assess
whether a given series has long memory is that it deals
only with asymptotic behaviour. To study the large-l
behaviour, it is necessary to observe more than l values
of X, but clearly any empirically observed time series
is finite. Also, the values of the function AX(l) can be
small, making estimation of the functional form of A very
difficult. Therefore, direct estimation of α from the au-
tocorrelation function often produces very poor results
(Lillo and Farmer, 2004).
An alternative way to characterize long memory is via
the diffusion properties (Beran, 1994; Lillo and Farmer,
2004) of the integrated series Y ,
Y (l) =
l∑
i=1
X(ti). (13)
If X is a long-memory process, then the standard devi-
ation of Y scales as O
(
lH
)
, with 12 < H ≤ 1 (Lillo and
Farmer, 2004); if X does not have long memory, then
the standard deviation of Y scales as O
(
l1/2
)
, (Beran,
1994). The exponent H is called the Hurst exponent, and
is related to α by
H = 1− α
2
. (14)
Under some assumptions,12 there are several asymp-
totically unbiased estimators of H that are more robust
to noise in X than is direct estimation of α from the
autocorrelation function (Taqqu et al., 1995). However,
the performance of such estimators on empirical data,
which might not conform to these assumptions, varies
considerably (Rea et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2005). Different
disciplines tend to favour different estimators, although
the choices are often based on historical reasons, not per-
formance. Some of the most commonly used are:
• the R/S statistic and modified R/S statistic (Lo,
1989; Teverovsky et al., 1999);
• log-periodogram regression (Geweke and Porter-
Hudak, 1983);
• order-m detrended fluctuation analysis (DFAm)
(Kantelhardt et al., 2001; La Spada and Lillo, 2011;
Peng et al., 1994).
12 Most commonly, that X is a fractional Brownian motion, i.e.,
a self-similar process with Gaussian increments (Beran, 1994;
Robinson, 2003).
As with the estimation of power laws discussed in Sec-
tion III.J.1, no single estimator has emerged as the best
in all situations, so some empirical studies report results
using several different estimators and then draw inference
based on them all (Taqqu et al., 1995).
IV. EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS IN LOBS
The empirical literature on LOBs is very large, yet dif-
ferent studies often present conflicting conclusions. Rea-
sons for this include different trade matching algorithms
operating differently, different asset classes being traded
on different exchanges, differing levels of liquidity in dif-
ferent markets, and different researchers having access to
data of differing quality. Furthermore, as traders’ strate-
gies have evolved over time, so too have the statistical
properties of the order flow they generate. This has
become a particularly important consideration because
competition and trading volumes have increased with the
widespread uptake of electronic trading algorithms.
To aid comparisons, we present in Appendix A a de-
scription of the aims, date range, data source, and data
type of each of the empirical studies of LOBs that we
discuss in this survey. We now discuss the main findings
of these empirical studies in more detail, including a se-
lection of stylized facts that have consistently emerged
from several different markets. However, we note in Sec-
tion VI that there have been few recent data analyses,
despite the many recent changes in markets.
A. Order size
Given the heterogeneous motivations for trading
within a single market, it is unsurprising that incom-
ing order sizes vary substantially. Nevertheless, several
regularities occur in empirical data.
For equities traded on the Paris Bourse, Bouchaud
et al. (2002) reported that the distribution of log(|ωx|)
was approximately uniform for incoming limit orders
with |ωx| ∈ (10, 50000). For two stocks traded on NAS-
DAQ, Maslov and Mills (2001) reported power-law and
log-normal distributions to fit the distribution of incom-
ing limit order sizes |ωx|. The mean reported power-law
exponent was 1± 0.3 (i.e., with standard deviation 0.3).
However, the quality of the power-law fits was deemed to
be weak, and the log-normal fits were deemed to be ap-
plicable over a wider range of limit order sizes than the
power-law fits (although the authors stated no precise
range of applicability for either). For four stocks on the
Island ECN, Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) reported
that incoming limit order sizes |ωx| clustered strongly at
round-number amounts such as 10, 100, and 1000. Mu
et al. (2009) reported a similar round-number preference
for market orders on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Mu
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et al. (2009) also studied the distribution of total trade
sizes when aggregated over a variety of time windows and
found it to exhibit a power-law tail. Different power-law
exponent estimators produced different estimates of the
tail exponent, but the authors judged the tail exponent
to be larger than 2. Maslov and Mills (2001) reported
similar power-law fits on NASDAQ. Studying 5 days of
data covering 3 equities, they reported a mean power-
law exponent of 1.4± 0.1. Although they did not state a
range of sizes over which their reported power-law distri-
butions applied, Figure 1 in Maslov and Mills (2001) sug-
gests an approximate range of 200 to 5000. In a study of
the 1000 largest equities in the USA, Gopikrishnan et al.
(2000) also reported power-law fits for the distribution
of trade sizes. The mean reported power-law exponent
was 1.53± 0.07. However, Bouchaud et al. (2009) noted
that the data studied by Gopikrishnan et al. contained
information about trades that were privately arranged
to occur off-book. They conjectured that this caused
Gopikrishnan et al. to overestimate the frequency with
which very large orders occurred.
On the Stockholm Stock Exchange, Hollifield et al.
(2004) reported that buy (respectively, sell) market or-
ders that walk up the book — i.e., those with a size |ωx| >
n(a(t), t) (respectively, ωx > |n(b(t), t)|) — accounted for
only 0.1% of submitted market orders. Therefore, the
vast majority of submitted buy (respectively, sell) market
orders matched only to active orders at a(t) (respectively,
b(t)), rather than at other prices.
B. Relative price
As discussed in Section II.A, regularities in price se-
ries are best investigated via the use of relative pricing,
as b(t) and a(t) themselves evolve through time. Unlike
the distribution of order sizes, which seems to vary from
market to market, the distribution of relative prices ap-
pears to exhibit power-law behaviour in all markets stud-
ied (Bouchaud et al., 2002; Gu et al., 2008b; Maskawa,
2007; Mike and Farmer, 2008; Potters and Bouchaud,
2003; Zovko and Farmer, 2002). This may be because
some traders place limit orders deep into LOBs, under
the optimistic belief that large price swings could occur
(Bouchaud et al., 2002).
The distribution of relative prices of orders that ar-
rived with non-negative relative price on the Paris
Bourse (Bouchaud et al., 2002), NASDAQ (Potters and
Bouchaud, 2003), the LSE (Maskawa, 2007; Zovko and
Farmer, 2002), and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Gu
et al., 2008b) were reported to follow such a power law,
with different values of the exponent for the different
markets. On the Paris Bourse, for buy and sell orders
alike, the power-law exponent for relative prices from pi
to over 100pi (even up to 1000pi for some stocks) was
approximately 0.6. On NASDAQ, the ranges of rela-
tive prices over which the distributions followed a power
law and the power-law exponents themselves both var-
ied from stock to stock. On the LSE, the value of the
power-law exponent was approximately 1.5 for relative
prices between 10pi and 2000pi for both buy and sell or-
ders. In aggregated data describing all 23 studied stocks
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the power-law expo-
nent for the distribution of non-negative relative prices13
was 1.72 ± 0.03 for buy orders and 1.15 ± 0.02 for sell
orders, and the power-law exponent for the distribution
of negative relative prices was 1.66± 0.07 for buy orders
and 1.80± 0.07 for sell orders. This asymmetry between
buy orders and sell orders contrasts to the other studied
markets, but the exact matching rules on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange prevent large price changes from occur-
ring within a single day (which could account for this
effect).
The maximum arrival rate of incoming orders was
found to occur at a relative price of 0 on the LSE
Mike and Farmer (2008), the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
(Gu et al., 2008b), the Paris Bourse (Biais et al., 1995;
Bouchaud et al., 2002), and NASDAQ (Challet and
Stinchcombe, 2001), although the maximum arrival rate
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange was found to occur inside
the spread (Cont et al., 2010).
C. Order cancellations
Several empirical studies covering a wide range of dif-
ferent markets have concluded that the vast majority of
active orders end in cancellation rather than matching.
The percentage of orders that were cancelled ranged from
approximately 70% to more than 80% on the Island ECN
(Challet and Stinchcombe, 2001; Hasbrouck and Saar,
2002), an exchange-traded fund that tracked the NAS-
DAQ 100 (Potters and Bouchaud, 2003), S&P 500 fu-
tures contracts (Baron et al., 2012), and in FX markets
(Gereben and Kiss, 2010; Lo and Sapp, 2010). Therefore,
cancellations play a major role in the evolution of L(t)
in all of these markets.
In recent years, electronic trading algorithms have
surged in popularity across all markets, and such algo-
rithms often submit and cancel vast numbers of limit or-
ders over short periods as part of their trading strategies
(Harris, 2002; Hendershott et al., 2011). The widespread
use of such trading algorithms seems to have further in-
creased the percentage of orders that are cancelled in
recent data. In particular, a recent study of FX data
found that more than 99.99% of active orders ended in
cancellation rather than matching (Gould et al., 2013b).
13 Observe that the notation used by Gu et al. (2008b) assigns the
opposite signs when measuring relative price than those that we
employ.
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D. Mean relative depth profile
Despite their different resolution parameters (see Sec-
tion II.A) and the different prices at which trades occur
in them, several qualitative regularities are common to
the mean relative depth profiles in a wide range of mar-
kets.
No significant difference was detected between the
mean bid-side and the mean ask-side relative depth pro-
files on the Paris Bourse (Biais et al., 1995; Bouchaud
et al., 2002), NASDAQ (Potters and Bouchaud, 2003),
and Standard and Poor’s Depositary Receipts (SPY)14
(Potters and Bouchaud, 2003). By contrast, Gu et al.
(2008c) reported asymmetry between the mean bid-side
and the mean ask-side relative depth profiles on the Shen-
zhen Stock Exchange, but this is unsurprising consider-
ing that this market has additional rules restricting price
movements each day that essentially impose asymmet-
ric restrictions on the range of relative prices over which
traders can submit orders.
Mean relative depth profiles exhibit a hump shape15
in a wide range of markets, including the Paris
Bourse (Bouchaud et al., 2002), NASDAQ (Potters and
Bouchaud, 2003), the Stockholm Stock Exchange (Hol-
lifield et al., 2004), and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
(Gu et al., 2008c). The maximal mean depth available
for SPY was reported to occur at b(t) and a(t), which
could also be considered as a hump with its maximum at
a relative price of 0 (Potters and Bouchaud, 2003).
The location of the hump varies across markets. How-
ever, it is difficult to perform direct comparisons between
different markets because differences in their tick sizes pi
affect both the granularity of the price axis and the ways
in which traders behave (see Section III.G). There may
also be strategic reasons that the hump occurs in different
locations in different markets. For example, in markets
in which large price changes are relatively common, more
traders can choose to submit limit orders with larger rel-
ative prices than in those where such changes are rare.
This increases the relative price at which the hump re-
sides. Ros¸u (2009) conjectured that a hump would exist
in all markets in which large market orders were suffi-
ciently likely; this represents a trade-off between the op-
timism that a limit order placed away from b(t) or a(t)
might eventually be matched (at a significant profit) and
the pessimism that placing limit orders too far away from
b(t) and a(t) might never match.
14 SPY is an exchange-traded fund that allows traders to effectively
buy and sell shares in all of the 500 largest stocks traded in the
USA.
15 More precisely, the absolute value of the mean depth available
increases over the first few relative prices, and it subsequently
decreases.
E. Conditional frequencies of events
The properties that we have discussed thus far in this
section have all been calculated unconditionally (i.e.,
without reference to other events or variables). However,
several factors influence how traders interact with LOBs,
so it is reasonable to study not only unconditional fre-
quencies, but also the frequencies of those events given
that some other condition was satisfied. However, the
study of such conditional event frequencies in LOBs is
difficult for two main reasons:
1. The state space is very large. Deciding which of the
enormous number of possible events or LOB states
on which to condition is very difficult (Parlour and
Seppi, 2008);
2. There is a small latency between the time that
a trader sends an instruction to submit or cancel
an order and the time that the exchange server
receives the instruction. Furthermore, some ex-
changes only send refresh signals at fixed time in-
tervals, so traders cannot be certain that LOBs that
they observe via their trading platform are perfect
representations of the actual LOBs at that instant
in time. Therefore, conditioning on the “most re-
cent” event is problematic, as the most recent event
recorded by the exchange (and thus appearing in
the market data) may not be the most recent event
that a given trader observed via the trading plat-
form.
Nevertheless, several empirical studies of conditional
event frequencies in LOBs have identified interesting be-
haviour. In this section, we review the key findings from
several such publications, highlighting both the similar-
ities and differences that have emerged across different
markets. Most studies have used LOB data that dates
back 10 years or more. Although this alleviates the afore-
mentioned difficulties with latency (as the volume of or-
der flows in LOBs was much smaller in the past than it is
today, so the mean inter-arrival times between successive
events were substantially longer than the latency times),
it also inevitably raises the question of how representa-
tive such findings are of today’s LOBs. We return to this
issue in Section VI.
1. Order size
A simple example of conditional structure is the rela-
tionship between the size |ωx| and the relative price δx of
orders on the Paris Bourse, as studied by Bouchaud et al.
(2002). For the stocks studied, the distribution of |ωx|
varied substantially according to the relative price of the
corresponding orders. In particular, orders with larger
relative price had smaller absolute size |ωx| on average.
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Maslov and Mills (2001) made a similar observation for
limit orders on NASDAQ.
2. Relative price
On the Paris Bourse (Biais et al., 1995) and the
Australian Stock Exchange (Cao et al., 2008; Hall and
Hautsch, 2006), traders placed more orders with a rela-
tive price δx satisfying −s(t) < δx < 0 (i.e., limit orders
falling inside of the bid-ask spread) at times when s(t)
was larger than its median value. Similarly, on the NYSE
(Ellul et al., 2003), the percentage of incoming orders
that arrived with a relative price δx > −s(t) (i.e., were
limit orders) increased as s(t) increased and decreased
when s(t) decreased. Biais et al. (1995) argued that when
s(t) is small, it is less expensive for traders to demand
immediate liquidity, so market orders become more at-
tractive. However, it is also possible to explain such an
observation via a zero-intelligence approach: if limit or-
der prices are chosen uniformly at random, then it is
more likely that an incoming limit order price resides in
the interval (b(t), a(t)) when the interval is wider.
On the Paris Bourse, Biais et al. (1995) found that the
percentage of buy (respectively, sell) limit orders that
arrived with relative price δx satisfying −s(t) < δx <
0 was higher at times when
∣∣nb(b(t), t)∣∣ (respectively,
na(a(t), t)) was larger. They conjectured that this was
evidence of traders competing for priority, as the only
way to gain higher priority than the active orders in the
(already long) queue in this situation is to submit an
order with a better price. Furthermore, on the NYSE,
Ellul et al. (2003) reported the arrival rate of buy (re-
spectively, sell) limit orders with a relative price δx satis-
fying −s(t) < δx < 0 tended to increase as the total size
of active buy (respectively, sell) orders increased. They
also reported a similar result for the arrival of buy (re-
spectively, sell) market orders. On the Australian Stock
exchange, Hall and Hautsch (2006) calculated that the
percentage of buy (respectively, sell) orders that were
limit orders decreased as the total size of active buy (re-
spectively, sell) orders increased, and Cao et al. (2008)
reported that the proportion of arriving orders that were
market orders increased when
∣∣nb(b(t), t)∣∣ and na(a(t), t)
were larger. On the LSE, Maskawa (2007) concluded
that traders favoured placing their limit orders at rel-
ative prices similar to those where there was already a
large number of active orders.
However, such conditional structure is not common
to all markets. On the LSE, Mike and Farmer (2008)
reported that the distribution of relative prices was in-
dependent of s(t). On the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,
Gu et al. (2008b) reported that the distribution of rel-
ative prices was independent of both s(t) and volatility.
On the Paris Bourse, Biais et al. (1995) concluded that∣∣nb(b(t), t)∣∣ (respectively, n(a(t), t)) had little impact on
the rate of incoming sell (respectively, buy) market or-
ders.
On the Swiss Stock Exchange, Ranaldo (2004) re-
ported that order flow to depend on several factors, in-
cluding volatility, recent order flow, and the state of L(t).
Traders submitted more limit orders and fewer market
orders during periods when s(t) or volatility were high.
The proportion of orders that arrived with negative rel-
ative price decreased as the inter-arrival time between
recent orders increased. Traders submitted higher priced
buy orders (respectively, lower priced sell orders) when
the total size of active buy (respectively, sell) orders was
greater. Ranaldo (2004) noted that buy order submission
seemed to depend on both the sell side and the ask side
of L(t), whereas sell order submission seemed to depend
only on the sell side of L(t). He noted, however, that
market performance during the sample period might have
caused such asymmetry, because the percentage change
in m(t) was positive for all but one of the stocks studied
and exceeded 10% for 4 of them.
On the LSE, Zovko and Farmer (2002) reported that
the relative prices of incoming limit orders were condi-
tional on the bid-price realized volatility per trade. They
constructed two time series by calculating the mean rel-
ative price of arriving buy limit orders and the bid-price
realized volatility per trade over 10 minute windows, and
then calculated their cross correlation. They rejected (at
the 2.5% level) the hypothesis that the two series were
uncorrelated and observed that changes in bid-price re-
alized volatility immediately preceded changes in mean
relative price for buy limit orders.16 They also observed
similar behaviour when comparing the time series of ask-
price realized volatility and the time series of mean rela-
tive price for sell limit orders.
In FX markets, Lo and Sapp (2010) reported that
traders submitted orders with higher relative prices dur-
ing periods of high mid-price realized volatility.
3. Order flows
On the Stockholm Stock Exchange, Sand˚as (2001) re-
ported that order flows at time t were conditional on both
L(t) and on previous order flows. In FX markets, Lo
and Sapp (2010) reported that order flows at time t were
conditional on several variables including s(t), nb(b(t), t),
16 Zovko and Farmer (2002) noted that it was not clear from the
cross-correlation function alone whether traders explicitly con-
sidered bid-price realized volatility when choosing the prices for
their buy limit orders, or whether some other external factor first
affected bid-price realized volatility and then affected traders’ ac-
tions. If the former could be demonstrated, it would support the
widely-held belief that many traders consider realized volatility
to be an important factor in deciding when to place a limit order
(Zovko and Farmer, 2002).
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na(a(t), t), depth available behind the best prices, time of
day, and recent order flows. However, the precise struc-
ture of the conditional dependences varied between cur-
rency pairs.
On the Australian Stock Exchange (Hall and Hautsch,
2006), the arrival rates of all market events were reported
to increase and decrease together. The authors suggested
that other exogenous factors (which they had not mea-
sured) might have influenced aggregate LOB activity. In
a more recent study of the Australian Stock Exchange,
Cao et al. (2008) reported that the arrival rates of market
events at time t were conditional on L(t), but not on the
state of L(t) at earlier times. This suggests that traders
evaluated only an LOB’s most recent state — and not
a longer history — when making order placement and
cancellation decisions. Cao et al. (2008) did not find evi-
dence that mid-price returns had a significant impact on
order arrival or cancellation rates.
Using several different financial instruments traded in
electronic LOBs, Toke (2011) reported that both buy
limit order and sell limit order arrival rates increased
following the arrival of a market order, but they found
no evidence that market order arrival rates increased fol-
lowing the arrival of a limit order.
4. Event clustering
Using data from 40 stocks on the Paris Bourse, Bi-
ais et al. (1995) observed strong clustering through time
when studying the “action classes” (such as “arrival of
buy market order”, “arrival of buy limit order within the
spread”, and “cancellation of active sell order”) of market
events. For all action classes, the conditional frequency
with which a market event belonged to the specified ac-
tion class, given that the previous market event also be-
longed to the same action class, was higher than the cor-
responding unconditional frequency. The authors offered
numerous possible explanations for this phenomenon:
traders might have strategically split large orders into
smaller chunks to avoid revealing their full trading inten-
tions or to minimize market impact (see Section IV.F);
different traders might have mimicked each other; dif-
ferent traders might have independently reacted to new
information; or different traders might have tried to un-
dercut each other (i.e., cancelled active buy (respectively,
sell) orders and resubmitted them at a slightly higher
(respectively, lower) price solely to gain price priority).
Bursts of small, frequent changes in b(t) and a(t) oc-
curred more often when s(t) was large, which they argued
provided evidence of undercutting. However, Bouchaud
et al. (2009) concluded that the phenomenon was driven
primarily by strategic order splitting and found no evi-
dence that different traders mimicked each other.
On the NYSE, Ellul et al. (2003) reported that periods
with above-average order arrival rates clustered together
in time, as did periods with below-average order arrival
rates. The rate of buy (respectively, sell) limit order
arrivals increased after periods of positive (respectively,
negative) mid-price returns, and the rate of limit order
arrivals also increased late in the trading day. There was
also a similar clustering of market events by action classes
as was observed by Biais et al. (1995) on the Paris Bourse.
However, Ellul et al. (2003) reported that the number
of occurrences of market events from a specific action
class in a given 5-minute window and the correspond-
ing number of occurrences of market events in the pre-
vious 5-minute window were negatively correlated. Fur-
thermore, they concluded that the arrival rate of market
events from a given action class was more heavily condi-
tional on the action class of the single most recent market
event than it was on L(t), whereas the distribution of the
number of occurrences of market events from a given ac-
tion class in a given 5-minute window was more heavily
conditional on L(t) during the previous 5-minute win-
dow than it was on the number of occurrences of market
events from any specific action class in the same window.
5. Cancellations
On the Paris Bourse, Biais et al. (1995) reported that
cancellations of buy (respectively, sell) active orders oc-
curred more frequently after the arrival of a buy (respec-
tively, sell) market order. They conjectured that this
was evidence that traders submitted large orders in the
hope of finding hidden liquidity and then cancelled any
unmatched portions.
On the Australian Stock Exchange, Cao et al. (2008)
concluded that priority considerations played a key role
for traders when deciding whether or not to cancel their
active orders. The cancellation rate for active buy
(respectively, sell) orders increased when new, higher-
priority buy (respectively, sell) limit orders arrived. In
addition, the cancellation rate of active buy (respectively,
sell) orders at prices p < b(t) (respectively, p > a(t)) in-
creased when n(p−pi, t) (respectively, n(p+pi, t)) became
zero. The authors proposed that this occurred because
traders with active orders at price p could, without sub-
stantial loss of priority, cancel and then resubmit them at
price p−pi (respectively, p+pi), to possibly gain a better
price if the order eventually matched. No similar increase
occurred when n(p + pi, t) (respectively, n(p − pi, t)) be-
came zero.
6. Price movements
On the Paris Bourse, Biais et al. (1995) reported
that a(t) decreased more frequently (respectively, b(t) in-
creased more frequently) immediately after the arrival of
a market order that caused b(t) to decrease (respectively,
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a(t) to increase). They suggested that such behaviour
could be due to traders reacting to information, either
because external sources of news caused a revaluation
of the underlying asset or because traders interpreted
the downward movement of b(t) (respectively, upward
movement of a(t)) itself as news. Indeed, Potters and
Bouchaud (2003) found evidence on NASDAQ that each
new trade was interpreted by traders as new information
that directly affected the flow of incoming orders.
7. Volatility
For Canadian stocks, Hollifield et al. (2006) reported
that several different volatility measures were correlated
with order flow rates. In FX markets, Lo and Sapp
(2010) reported that mid-price realized volatility affected
order flows. For US equities traded on Island ECN,
Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) found a lower proportion
of limit orders in the arriving order flow during periods
with higher volatility (using a variety of different volatil-
ity measures). Submitted limit orders had an increased
probability of execution and a shorter expected time un-
til execution during such periods. Furthermore, on Eu-
ronext (Chakraborti et al., 2011b) and for German In-
dex Futures (Kempf and Korn, 1999), mid-price realized
volatility increased with the number of arriving market
orders. Jones et al. (1994) reported a similar finding in
a study of the NYSE; however, Ellul et al. (2003) later
reported a positive correlation between higher mid-price
realized volatility and the percentage of arriving orders
that were limit orders.
On the Australian Stock Exchange, Hall and Hautsch
(2006) reported that the number of arrivals and cancella-
tions of large limit orders (i.e., those whose size was in the
upper quartile of the unconditional empirical distribution
of order sizes) in any given 5-minute window was posi-
tively correlated with mid-price realized volatility during
both that window and the previous 5-minute window.
However, in a more recent study (Cao et al., 2008) con-
cluded that mid-price realized volatility per trade had
only a minimal effect on order flows.
A weak but positive correlation between s(t) and re-
alized mid-price volatility has been observed in a wide
range of markets (see Wyart et al. (2008) and references
therein). However, a much stronger positive correla-
tion between s(t) and mid-price volatility was observed
at the trade-by-trade timescale on the Paris Bourse
(Bouchaud et al., 2004), the FTSE 100 (Zumbach, 2004),
and the NYSE (Wyart et al., 2008). In a recent study
of stocks traded on the NYSE, Hendershott et al. (2011)
reported that the once-daily time series of bid-price re-
alized volatility was positively correlated with the daily
mean spread. Stocks with a lower mid price had higher
bid-price realized volatilty on average. In FX markets, Lo
and Sapp (2010) reported that the variance of the depth
available at any given price increased during periods of
high mid-price realized volatility. Hasbrouck and Saar
(2002) investigated links between volatility and various
aspects of the depth profile on the Island ECN, but they
found only weak relationships.
As discussed in Section III.A, Bortoli et al. (2006) re-
ported that mid-price intra-day volatility on the Sydney
Futures Exchange varied according to how much infor-
mation about the depth profile traders could view in real
time.
F. Market impact and price impact
A key consideration for a trader who wishes to buy or
sell a large quantity of an asset is how his or her actions
might affect the asset’s LOB (Almgren and Chriss, 2001;
Bouchaud et al., 2009; Cont et al., 2011; Eisler et al.,
2012; Obizhaeva and Wang, 2013). For example, if trader
θi wishes to buy 20σ shares using the LOB displayed in
Figure IV.F, then submitting a single market order of
size ωx = −20σ would result in purchasing 2σ shares
at $1.5438, 5σ shares at $1.5439, 6σ shares at $1.5440,
and 7σ shares at $1.5441. However, if θi were initially
to submit only a market order of size ωx = −2σ, then
it is possible that other traders might submit new limit
orders, because by purchasing the 2σ shares with highest
priority in the LOB, θi has made it more attractive for
other participants to submit new sell limit orders than
it was immediately before such a purchase. If this oc-
curs, then θi could submit a market order that matches
to these newly submitted limit orders and then repeat
this process until all 20σ shares are purchased. Empiri-
cal observations suggest that such order splitting is very
common in a wide range of different markets (Bouchaud
et al., 2009). Of course, there is no guarantee that the
initial market order of size 2σ would stimulate such sub-
missions of limit orders from other traders. Indeed, it
could even cause other traders to cancel their existing
limit orders or to submit buy market orders, further in-
creasing a(t) and thereby ultimately causing θi to pay a
higher price for the total purchase of 20σ shares.
The change in b(t) and a(t) caused by a trader’s actions
is called the price impact of the actions. The necessity for
traders to monitor and control price impact predates the
widespread adoption of LOBs. In a quote-driven market,
for example, any single market maker only has access
to a finite inventory, so there is a limit on the size that
is available for trade at the quoted prices. Furthermore,
purchasing or selling large quantities of the asset in such a
market could cause market makers to adjust their quoted
prices. Both of these outcomes are examples of price
impact. In an LOB, however, it is possible to consider
the impact of an action on the entire state of L(t). This
more general type of impact is called market impact. To
date, the terms “price impact” and “market impact” have
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FIG. 4 An example LOB to illustrate price impact and mar-
ket impact.
often been used interchangeably to refer only to changes
in b(t) or a(t), but recent work (Hautsch and Huang,
2011) has shed light on how traders’ actions can affect
the depths available at other prices, suggesting that it is
appropriate to separate the two notions.
Bouchaud et al. (2009) provided a detailed review of
studies of both price impact and market impact. Both
are difficult to quantify formally, as they each consist of
two components:
• instantaneous (or immediate) impact, which con-
sists of the immediate effects of a specified action;
• permanent impact, which consists of the long-term
impact due to a specified action causing other
traders to behave differently in the future.
For example, the instantaneous price impact of a market
buy order of size 2σ in the LOB in Figure IV.F is a
change in a(t) from $1.5438 to $1.5439. An example of
permanent market impact of this buy market order might
be another trader deciding to submit a new sell limit
order at the price $1.5442. The various forms of impact
are defined as follows.
Definition. The instantaneous bid-price impact of a
market event at time t′ is
b(t′)− lim
t↑t′
b(t). (15)
Definition. The instantaneous bid-price logarithmic re-
turn impact of a market event at time t′ is
log b(t′)− lim
t↑t′
[log b(t)] . (16)
Definition. The instantaneous bid-price impact func-
tion φb(ωx) outputs the mean instantaneous bid-price im-
pact for a buy market order of size ωx.
Definition. The instantaneous bid-price logarithmic re-
turn impact function Φb(ωx) outputs the mean instanta-
neous bid-price logarithmic return impact for a buy mar-
ket order of size ωx.
Definitions for the ask price, using sell market orders
of size ωx (respectively, mid price, using both buy and
sell market orders of size |ωx|) are similar.
Definition. The instantaneous market impact of a mar-
ket event at time t′ is
L(t′) \ lim
t↑t′
L(t), (17)
where \ denotes the difference of the two sets.
Instantaneous impact exists because the arrival or can-
cellation of any order affects L(t) directly. Bouchaud
et al. (2009) described three reasons that permanent im-
pact might exist. First, trades themselves might con-
vey information to other traders.17 Second, traders
might successfully forecast short-term price movements
and choose their actions accordingly.18 Third, purely
random fluctuations in supply and demand might lead
to permanent impact.
It is not possible to quantify precisely the permanent
price or market impact of an action, because doing so
would involve calculating the differences between scenar-
ios in which the action did happen and the action did
not happen. However, all actions either happen or do
not happen, so such comparisons are impossible in prac-
tice.
1. Instantaneous price impact
To date, instantaneous price impact for individual mar-
ket orders has been studied primarily via instantaneous
price impact and instantaneous logarithmic return im-
pact functions. On the NYSE and American Stock Ex-
change, Hasbrouck (1991) found φm to be a concave func-
tion of |ωx|. This implies that the instantaneous price im-
pact of a single market order of size |ωx| was, on average,
larger than the sum of the instantaneous price impacts
of two market orders x1 and x2 of sizes |ωx1 | and |ωx2 |,
with |ωx1 |+ |ωx2 | = |ωx|.
Lillo et al. (2003) studied the stocks of 1000 differ-
ent companies traded on the NYSE and sorted them
17 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) introduced this idea for a general
market, and it has since been discussed extensively in an LOB
context (see, e.g., Almgren and Chriss (2001); Bouchaud et al.
(2009); Hasbrouck (1991); Potters and Bouchaud (2003)).
18 This explanation suggests that it is not traders’ actions that
cause the value of an asset to rise or fall. Instead, such changes
in valuation happen exogenously and traders align their actions
with them to maximize profits. Bouchaud et al. (2009) did not
find evidence that this was a good reflection of reality.
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into 20 groups according to their market capitalization
(i.e., according to the total value of all of a given com-
pany’s shares). Within each group, they then merged
their data and fitted a single curve to Φm(|ωx|). For all
20 groups, they concluded that Φm followed a power law
Φm(|ωx|) ≈ |ωx|α, with an exponent α that depended
on the group and varied between approximately 0.2 and
0.5. However, no goodness-of-fit statistics were presented
with the results and it is not clear how well the fits per-
formed for individual stocks. After the change of vari-
ables
ω′x :=
ωx
Cη
, p′ := pCγ , (18)
where C was the mean market capitalization for stocks
in the group and η and γ were fitted constants, the
Φm
′
(|ω′x|) curves for each of the 20 groups collapsed onto
a single curve.
Farmer et al. (2005) reported a similar collapse of Φm
onto a single power-law curve Φm
′
(|ω′x|) ≈ |ω′x|0.25 for
11 stocks traded on the LSE after using the change of
variables
ω′x :=
ωxα
µ
, p′ :=
pλ
µ
, (19)
where µ, λ, and ν denote the mean arrival rate of market
orders, the mean arrival rate of limit orders, and the
mean cancellation rate of active orders per unit size σ,
respectively.
Using data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Zhou
(2012) partitioned incoming orders according to whether
or not they received an immediate full matching19 of size
ωx at time tx. The resulting functional form of Φ
m(ωx)
was different in the two cases.
• For incoming orders that only partially matched
upon arrival, Φm(|ωx|) was constant for all |ωx| <
10000 shares, and it then increased for larger values
of |ωx|.
• For incoming orders that fully matched upon ar-
rival, Φm(|ωx|) followed the power law Φm(|ωx|) ≈
A |ωx|α, where A was a constant that varied across
stocks. Among buy orders, the mean value of α
was 0.66±0.05. Among sell orders, the mean value
of α was 0.69± 0.06.
After applying the change of variables
Φ′m(|ωx|) := Φ
m(|ωx|)
〈Φm〉 , ω
′
x :=
ωx
〈|ωx|〉 , (20)
19 Incoming orders that are fully matched upon arrival always have
a strictly smaller instantaneous mid-price impact than orders
that are not.
where the angle brackets 〈·〉 denote the mean value taken
across all incoming market orders in the data, Zhou con-
cluded that the Φ′m(ω′x) curves for all studied stocks
collapsed onto a single curve for incoming orders that
were fully matched upon arrival and onto a different sin-
gle curve for incoming orders that were only partially
matched upon arrival. The asymmetry between the bid
side and the ask side was no longer present after the
rescaling.
On both the Paris Bourse and NASDAQ, Potters and
Bouchaud (2003) reported that a logarithmic functional
form provided a better fit to φm than did a power-law
relationship. Furthermore, Farmer and Lillo (2004) con-
cluded that power-law relationships overestimated the
mean instantaneous mid-price impact of very large mar-
ket orders on both the LSE and the NYSE.
2. Permanent price impact
As discussed above, it is impossible to quantify exactly
the permanent price impact of a market event. However,
to gain some insight into the longer-term effects of market
events, several empirical studies have compared changes
in b(t) and a(t) over specified time intervals with mea-
sures of trade imbalance.
Definition. The trade imbalance count during time in-
terval T = [t1, t2], denoted Ω
c(T ), is the difference be-
tween the total number of incoming buy market orders
and the total number of incoming sell market orders that
arrive during time interval T .
Definition. The trade imbalance size during time inter-
val T = [t1, t2], denoted Ω
ω(T ), is the difference between
the total absolute size of all incoming buy market orders
and the total size of all incoming sell market orders that
arrive during time interval T .
Evans and Lyons (2002) reported a statistically sig-
nificant, positive, linear relationship between the daily
trade imbalance count and the ask-price logarithmic re-
turn for successive trading days in FX markets. For Ger-
man Stock Index futures, Kempf and Korn (1999) re-
ported that the mean mid-price logarithmic return in a
5-minute window was a concave function of the trade im-
balance count during that window. For the largest 100
stocks on the NYSE, Gabaix et al. (2006) reported that
the mean mid-price logarithmic return followed the rela-
tionship Ωω(T )0.5 for time intervals of length T = 15 min-
utes. Using a variety of different time interval lengths for
the 116 most liquid stocks in the US in 1994–1995, Plerou
et al. (2002) reported that the mean change in mid-price
over the interval was a concave function of Ωω(T ). Fur-
thermore, for small values of Ωω(T ), the mean change
in mid-price over the interval was well approximated by
Ωω(T )α, where the value of α depended on the length of
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T . The values of α ranged from α ≈ 1/3 for intervals of
length 5 minutes to α ≈ 1 for intervals of length 195 min-
utes. Similarly, Bouchaud et al. (2009) reported that as
the length of T increased, the mean mid-price logarith-
mic return of the AstraZeneca stock on the LSE became
better approximated by a linear function of the length T .
Cont et al. (2011) recently proposed that price impact
in LOBs should be studied as a function of the difference
between aggregate order flow on the bid and ask sides,
rather than of Ωω(T ). They thereby acknowledged that
cancellations can also have price impact. Using data for
50 stockes traded on the NYSE, they performed (sepa-
rately for each stock) an ordinary least-squares regres-
sion of the mean change in mid-price over a time window
of length 10 seconds onto the order flow imbalance over
the same time window. For 43 of the stocks studied,
the slope of the regression line was significantly different
from 0 at the 95% level and was larger on average for
those stocks with smaller mean values of |n(b(t), t)| and
n(a(t), t). Cont et al. (2011) noted that their ordinary
least squares regressions provided a strong fit across all
stocks, despite the nuances of how the individual stocks
were traded. Regressions using Ωω(T ) rather than order
flow imbalance as the independent variable produced sig-
nificantly worse fits to the data. Cont et al. (2011) con-
jectured that any observable relationship between price
impact and Ωω(T ) was actually a byproduct of the cor-
relation between Ωω(T ) and order flow imbalance.
3. Market impact
In contrast to the wealth of empirical studies on price
impact, almost no publications address the market im-
pact of a given action. To our knowledge, the sole excep-
tion is the study of how order arrivals affected the state
of the LOBs L(t) for 30 stocks on Euronext by Hautsch
and Huang (2011). Limit orders placed with negative
relative price had a significant market impact, and limit
orders placed with price p ≤ b(t) (respectively, p ≥ a(t))
caused a significant permanent increase in b(t) (respec-
tively, decrease in a(t)). On average, the market impact
of a market order was about four times greater than that
of a limit order of the same size, and limit orders with
relative prices of pi or 2pi affected b(t) and a(t) about
20% less than limit orders placed at b(t) and a(t). Limit
orders that arrived with non-negative relative price had
no immediate market impact but significant permanent
market impact. This impact materialized more quickly
for limit orders that arrived at b(t) and a(t) than it did
for limit orders that arrived with positive relative prices.
By contrast, the market impact of limit orders placed
inside of the bid-ask spread was largely instantaneous,20
with little permanent impact.
Hautsch and Huang (2011) reported similar results
for all stocks studied, but they reported asymmetries
between the bid side and the ask side of L(t), much
like Kempf and Korn (1999) reported for price impact.
Hautsch and Huang (2011) conjectured that the impact
that they observed was due partly to arriving orders trig-
gering an instantaneous imbalance in supply and demand
and partly to other traders interpreting order arrivals as
containing information, thereby causing them to adjust
their own future actions and leading to permanent mar-
ket impact. In their view, the results suggested that the
arrivals of market orders were interpreted by traders as
particularly strong information signals. This observation
provides a possible explanation as to why so many traders
choose to place iceberg orders: placing an iceberg order
is an effective way to hide the true size of limit orders
from the market and thus to minimize market impact.
G. Stylized facts
Several nontrivial statistical regularities exist in em-
pirical data from a wide range of different markets. Such
regularities are known as the stylized facts of markets
(Buchanan, 2011), and they might provide interesting in-
sights into the behaviour of traders (Cont, 2001) and the
structure of markets themselves (Bouchaud et al., 2009).
Stylized facts are also useful from a modelling perspec-
tive, because a model’s inability to reproduce one or more
stylized facts can be used as an indicator for how it needs
to be improved or as a reason to rule it out altogether.
For example, the existence of volatility clustering elim-
inates the simple random walk as a model for the tem-
poral evolution of the mid price m(t), as the existence of
volatility clustering in real mid-price time series implies
that large price variations are more likely to follow large
price variations than they are to occur unconditionally
(Lo and MacKinlay, 2001).
Reproduction of stylized facts remains a serious chal-
lenge for LOB models (Chakraborti et al., 2011a,b; Chen
et al., 2012). This is particularly true for those based on
zero-intelligence assumptions, which have tended to pro-
duce more volatile price series than empirical observa-
tions suggest is appropriate (Chakraborti et al., 2011a).
This may imply that the strategic behaviour of real
traders somehow stabilizes prices, and it is therefore an
important ingredient in real LOB trading.
Cont (2001) and Chen et al. (2012) both reviewed a
wide range of stylized facts; we will survey a small sub-
set that we consider to be the most relevant from an
20 A buy (respectively, sell) limit order placed inside the bid-ask
spread necessarily affects b(t) (respectively, a(t)) immediately.
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LOB perspective. These stylized facts are of particular
theoretical interest as they suggest that nonequilibrium
behaviour plays an important role in LOBs. A result
from statistical mechanics is that systems in equilibrium
yield distributions from the exponential family (Mike and
Farmer, 2008), whereas distributions describing several
aspects of LOB behaviour exhibit power-law tails, high-
lighting the possibility that LOBs might always be in a
transient state.
1. Heavy-tailed return distributions
Over all timescales ranging from seconds to days,
the unconditional distribution of mid-price returns dis-
plays tails that are heavier than a normal distribution
(i.e., they have positive excess kurtosis). Understand-
ing heavy tails is central to risk management of invest-
ment strategies, because large price movements are more
likely than they would be if returns were normally dis-
tributed. Heavy tails have been observed on Euronext
(Chakraborti et al., 2011b), the Paris Bourse (Plerou
and Stanley, 2008), the S&P 500 index (Cont, 2001; Gal-
lant et al., 1992; Gopikrishnan et al., 1999), FX mar-
kets (Guillaume et al., 1997), the NYSE (Gopikrishnan
et al., 1998), the American Stock Exchange (Gopikrish-
nan et al., 1998; Plerou and Stanley, 2008), NASDAQ
(Gopikrishnan et al., 1998), the LSE (Plerou and Stan-
ley, 2008), and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Gu et al.,
2008a). However, the exact form of the distribution
varies with the timescale used. Across a wide range of
different markets (see, e.g., Gopikrishnan et al. (1998)
and Gu et al. (2008a)), the tails of the distribution at
the shortest timescales appear to be well-approximated
by a power law with exponent α ≈ 3, thereby earning
the monicker “the inverse cubic law of returns”. Stan-
ley et al. (2008) conjectured that such a universal tail
might be a consequence of power-law tails in both the
distribution of market order sizes and the instantaneous
mid-price logarithmic return impact function. However,
Mu and Zhou (2010) reported that this relationship did
not hold in emerging markets. Droz˙dz˙ et al. (2007) re-
ported that the tails were less heavy (i.e., α > 3) in high-
frequency market data for German, American, and Polish
indices from 2004 to 2006, highlighting that the quantita-
tive form of stylized facts might themselves change over
time as trading styles evolve. At longer timescales, the
distribution becomes increasingly well approximated by
a normal distribution. This behaviour is often called ag-
gregational Gaussianity (Cont, 2001; Gopikrishnan et al.,
1999; Zhao, 2010).
2. Volatility clustering
Time series of absolute or square mid-price returns dis-
play long memory (see Section III.J.2) over timescales of
weeks or even months (Cont, 2001; Liu et al., 1997; Stan-
ley et al., 2008). For example, the square mid-price re-
turns for S&P 500 index futures (Cont, 2001), the NYSE
(Cont, 2005), the USD/JPY currency pair (Cont et al.,
1997), and crude oil futures (Zhao, 2010) all exhibit long
memory at intra-day timescales, as do absolute mid-price
returns on the Paris Bourse (Chakraborti et al., 2011b)
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Gu and Zhou, 2009a).
Reported values of the Hurst exponent H vary from
H ≈ 0.8 on the Paris Bourse and H ≈ 0.815 for the
USD/JPY currency pair to H ≈ 0.58 on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange. The long memory of absolute or square
mid-price returns is often called volatility clustering be-
cause it indicates that large price changes tend to follow
other large price changes. There are several possible ex-
planations for volatility clustering, including the arrival
of external news and the strategic splitting of orders by
traders (Bouchaud et al., 2009).
3. Long memory in order flow
On the LSE, Lillo and Farmer (2004) reported that
the time series n(b(t), t) and n(a(t), t) exhibited long
memory, and Zovko and Farmer (2002) reported that
the time series of relative prices of limit orders exhib-
ited long memory with Hurst exponent H ≈ 0.8. Gu
and Zhou (2009a) reported similar long memory in the
relative prices of limit orders on the Shenzhen Stock Ex-
change, with H = 0.78. The time series constructed by
assigning the value +1 to incoming buy orders and −1
to incoming sell orders has been reported to exhibit long
memory on the Paris Bourse (Bouchaud et al., 2004), the
NYSE (Lillo and Farmer, 2004), and the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (Gu and Zhou, 2009a). On the LSE, Bouchaud
et al. (2009), Lillo and Farmer (2004), and Mike and
Farmer (2008) reported that similar results hold for mar-
ket order arrivals, limit order arrivals, and active or-
der cancellations, with statistically significant differences
between the estimated values of H for different stocks.
However, Axioglou and Skouras (2011) also studied the
series of arriving market orders on the LSE and concluded
that the apparent long memory reported by Lillo and
Farmer (2004) was actually an artifact caused by market
participants changing trading strategies once per day.21
21 Stochastic processes that undergo regime switching are known
to cause several estimators to report a Hurst exponent H 6= 1
2
even in the absence of long memory.
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4. Autocorrelation and long memory of returns
Except on very short timescales, when they exhibit
weak negative autocorrelation, return series do not dis-
play any significant autocorrelation (Chakraborti et al.,
2011b; Cont, 2005; Stanley et al., 2008). This well-
established empirical fact has been observed in a very
large number of markets, including the NYSE (Aı¨t-
Sahalia et al., 2011; Cont, 2005), Euronext (Chakraborti
et al., 2011b), FX markets (Bouchaud and Potters, 2003;
Cont et al., 1997), the S&P 500 index (Bouchaud and
Potters, 2003; Gopikrishnan et al., 1999), German inter-
est rates futures contracts (Bouchaud and Potters, 2003),
and crude oil futures (Zhao, 2010). The absence of au-
tocorrelation in returns can be explained using perfect-
rationality arguments (Cont, 2001). If returns were in-
deed autocorrelated, rational traders would employ sim-
ple strategies that used this fact to generate positive ex-
pected earnings. Such actions would themselves reduce
the level of autocorrelation, so autocorrelation would not
persist.
It appears that the negative autocorrelation present on
the shortest timescales disappears more quickly in more
recent market data than it does in older data, which in-
dicates that the exact quantitative details of this stylized
fact may have changed over time. Using data from the
S&P 500 index, Gopikrishnan et al. (1999) reported neg-
ative autocorrelation in mid-price returns on timescales
of up to about 20 minutes during 1984–1996 but only on
timescales of up to 10 minutes during 1991–2001. Dur-
ing 1991–1995, Bouchaud and Potters (2003) reported
that negative autocorrelation persisted up to timescales
of 20 to 30 minutes for the GBP/USD currency pair and
for German interest rate futures contracts, but did not
persist for timescales longer than 30 minutes. On the
NYSE, Cont (2005) reported that negative autocorre-
lation persisted on 5-minute timescales but not on 10-
minute timescales, but did not report an exact date of
when the data itself were collected. Using data from
Euronext during 2007–2008, Chakraborti et al. (2011b)
found no significant autocorrelation over time windows
of 1 minute. Furthermore, on NYSE data from 2010,
Cont et al. (2011) found no significant autocorrelation
over any timescales of 20 seconds or longer. For crude oil
futures contracts traded in 2005, Zhao (2010) reported
that negative autocorrelation persisted for only 10 to 15
seconds.
The various forms of long memory in order flow (see
Section IV.G.3) might be expected to lead to long mem-
ory in return series. However, return series on the LSE
(Lillo and Farmer, 2004), the Paris Bourse (Bouchaud
et al., 2004), the Deutsche Bourse (Carbone et al., 2004),
and in FX markets (Gould et al., 2013c) all have H ≈ 0.5
(i.e., they exhibit no long memory) on all but the short-
est timescales.22 Bouchaud et al. (2004) conjectured that
this was because the long memory in price changes caused
by the long memory in the arrival of market orders was
negatively correlated to the long memory in price changes
caused by the long memory in the arrival and cancellation
of limit orders. However, Lillo and Farmer (2004) found
no evidence to support this hypothesis using data from
the LSE. Instead, they concluded that the long memory
in the arrival of market orders was offset by the long
memory in n(b(t), t) and n(a(t), t). When predictability
of market order arrivals was high, the probability that
a buy (respectively, sell) market order caused a change
in m(t) was low, because |n(b(t), t)| and n(a(t), t) were
large. Therefore, the long memory in the arrival of mar-
ket orders did not cause a long memory in price changes.
V. MODELLING LOBS
In recent years, the economics and physics commu-
nities have both made substantial progress with LOB
modelling (Chakraborti et al., 2011a; Parlour and Seppi,
2008). However, work by the two communities has
remained largely independent (Farmer et al., 2005).
Economists have tended to be trader-centric, using
perfect-rationality frameworks to derive optimal trading
strategies given certain market conditions. The LOB
models produced by economists have generally treated
order flow as static. By contrast, models from physi-
cists have tended to be conceptual toy models of the
evolution of L(t). By relating changes in order flow to
properties of L(t), these models treat order flow as dy-
namic (Farmer et al., 2005). The two approaches have
different strengths: an understanding of trading strate-
gies is crucial for traders and regulators (Alfonsi et al.,
2010; Almgren and Chriss, 2001; Cao et al., 2008; Evans
and Lyons, 2002; Foucault et al., 2005; Gatheral, 2010;
Goettler et al., 2006; Hall and Hautsch, 2006; Hollifield
et al., 2006; Ros¸u, 2010; Sand˚as, 2001; Seppi, 1997; Wyart
et al., 2008); an understanding of the state of L(t) and
order flow provides insight into the origins of statistical
regularities, including whether they are a consequence of
market microstructure or of traders’ strategic behaviour
(Bouchaud et al., 2009; Farmer et al., 2005; Gu and Zhou,
2009a; Mike and Farmer, 2008; Smith et al., 2003).
In this section, we assess existing LOB models in terms
of their ability to accurately mimic the trading mecha-
nism and to reproduce empirical facts (see Section IV).
22 There is no clear agreement about the long-memory properties
of return series at the shortest timescales. This is unsurprising,
however, because microstructure effects (which vary greatly from
market to market) play a prominent role in the statistical prop-
erties of return series at the shortest timescales, and estimation
of H is extremely sensitive to such differences in data.
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We also highlight the main modelling difficulties that are
yet to be resolved.
A. Perfect-rationality approaches
In the traditional economics approach, rational in-
vestors faced with straightforward buy or sell possibil-
ities choose portfolio strategies of holdings to maximize
personal utility, subject to budget constraints (Parlour
and Seppi, 2008). However, LOBs provide a substan-
tially more complicated scenario. Rather than submit-
ting orders for exact quantities at exact prices, an in-
vestor may attempt to construct an ideal portfolio using
both limit orders and market orders. The inherent un-
certainty of execution of limit orders thereby creates un-
certainty about the state of the portfolio at a given time.
When deciding whether to submit a given limit order, a
trader must estimate its fill probability, which depends
endogenously on both L(t) and future order flow.
1. Cut-off strategies
Many early perfect-rationality models aimed to ad-
dress traders’ decision-making via the use of a cut-off
strategy.
Definition. When choosing between decision D1 and de-
cision D2 at time t, an individual employing a cut-off
strategy compares the value of a statistic Z(t) with a cut-
off point z and makes the decision
D1, if Z ≤ z,
D2, otherwise.
(21)
A cut-off strategy is analogous to a hypothesis test in
statistical inference. The statistic Z(t) can be any statis-
tic related to L(t), current or recent order flow, the ac-
tions of other traders, and so on. For example, a trader
who wishes to place a buy order at time t might decide
to submit a buy market order if s(t) is smaller than 5pi
or to submit a buy limit order otherwise. Cut-off strate-
gies often appear in perfect-rationality models because
they drastically reduce the dimensionality of the deci-
sion space available to traders. This is very appealing
from the standpoint of tractability.
To our knowledge, the first model that addressed en-
dogenous decision-making between limit orders and mar-
ket orders in a setting that resembled an LOB was the
single-period model of Chakravarty and Holden (1995).
First, a market maker arrived and set quotes. All other
traders then arrived simultaneously and chose between
submitting limit or market orders using a cut-off strategy
based on the difference between their private valuations
of the asset and the quotes set by the market maker. Fi-
nally, all trades occurred simultaneously using pro-rata
priority.23 This model demonstrated that optimal strate-
gies for informed traders could involve submitting either
limit orders or market orders, depending on how the mar-
ket maker acted. In turn, this highlighted endogenous
order choice for traders as a crucial feature of a success-
ful LOB model. However, the inclusion of the designated
market maker and the assumption that the market oper-
ated for only a single time period poorly reflects trading
in real LOBs.
Foucault (1999) extended the work of Chakravarty and
Holden (1995) by modelling LOB trading as a multi-step
game in which traders arrived sequentially. Limit orders
remained active for only one period; if the next arriv-
ing trader did not submit a market order to match to
an existing limit order, then it expired. Upon arrival,
each trader chose between placing a limit order or a mar-
ket order and then left the market forever. After each
such departure, the game ended with some fixed prob-
ability; otherwise, a new trader arrived and the process
was repeated. Foucault showed that each trader’s opti-
mal strategy in this game was a cut-off strategy based on
his or her private valuation of the asset and the price of
the existing limit order (if one existed).
Foucault’s model highlighted that the probability of
matching for an active order in a LOB depends explic-
itly on future traders’ actions (which themselves are en-
dogenous) and that traders must actively consider other
traders’ strategies. However, Foucault’s model contained
several assumptions that poorly mimic important aspects
of real LOBs — e.g., that limit orders remain active for
only a single period and that a random, exogenous stop-
ping time governs trading. These assumptions restrict
the model’s ability to make realistic predictions about
order flow dynamics and how traders estimate order fill
probabilities.
Parlour (1998) studied a multi-step game in an LOB
that only allowed limit orders to be submitted at a single,
specific price. Traders arrived sequentially and chose en-
dogenously between submitting a limit order at this price
or submitting a market order. Unlike the model from
Foucault (1999), limit orders did not expire. The work
identified explicit links between traders’ strategies and
L(t). In particular, Parlour demonstrated that the opti-
mal decision between submitting a limit order or a mar-
ket order should be made by employing a cut-off strategy
that assessed both sides of L(t) to estimate the fill prob-
ability for a limit order. If the estimated fill probability
was sufficiently high, then the trader should submit a
limit order; otherwise, he or she should submit a mar-
ket order. Parlour argued that limit orders become less
attractive later in a trading day due to their lower fill
probabilities before the end of trading. However, by dis-
allowing cancellations of active orders and by restricting
23 There is no concept of time priority in a single-period framework.
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the pricing grid to a single value, Parlour’s model sim-
plified the decision-making process of how to act in real
LOBs (Hollifield et al., 2006).
Hollifield et al. (2004) tested the hypothesis that cut-
off strategies such as those discussed above could explain
the observed actions of traders trading the Ericsson stock
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Working at the 1%
level, they accepted this hypothesis when the bid side
or the ask side of L(t) were each considered in isolation
but rejected it when both sides of L(t) were considered
together, due to the existence of several limit orders with
extremely low fill probabilities whose expected payoffs
were too low for the model to justify. Hollifield et al.
(2004) concluded that cancellations, which were absent
from the models discussed above, must play an important
role in real LOBs.
Hollifield et al. (2006) studied a model in which can-
cellations were endogenous. By comparing predictions
made by the model to data from the Vancouver Stock
Exchange, they concluded that real traders did not make
decisions using a common cut-off strategy.
2. Fundamental values and informed traders
Some perfect-rationality models centre around the idea
that a subset of traders are informed traders who know
the “fundamental” or “true” value of the traded as-
set, whereas everyone else is uninformed and does not
know this true value (see, e.g., Copeland and Galai
(1983); Glosten (1994); Glosten and Milgrom (1985);
Kyle (1985)). Bouchaud et al. (2009) noted that many
researchers now reject the idea that assets have funda-
mental values, but such models can still provide insight
into price formation in markets with asymmetric infor-
mation.
In the classic Kyle (1985) model, uninformed traders
placed limit orders and market orders in an LOB. At the
same time, informed traders observed this LOB and, if an
uninformed trader posted a buy limit order with a price
above (respectively, sell limit order with a price below)
the fundamental value, then an informed trader submit-
ted a market order that matched to the mispriced limit
order and thereby made a profit. However, more recent
models (Chakravarty and Holden, 1995; Ros¸u, 2010) have
noted several reasons that informed traders should some-
times choose to submit limit orders rather than market
orders — for example, to avoid detection by other traders
who would mimic their actions if they knew them to be
informed (Ros¸u, 2010).
Goettler et al. (2006) studied a model in which traders
arrived at an LOB following a Poisson process. Upon
arrival, a trader submitted any desired orders, choos-
ing freely among prices. He or she then left the market
and re-arrived following an independent Poisson process.
Upon re-arrival, a trader could cancel or modify his or
her active orders. When a trader performed a trade, he
or she left the market forever. Additionally, any trader
could, at any time, pay a fee to become informed about
the fundamental value of the asset. Such traders stayed
informed until they eventually traded and left the mar-
ket. Goettler et al. concluded that a trader’s willing-
ness to purchase the information should decrease as his
or her desire to trade increases. They concluded that
speculators, who trade purely for profit, should buy the
information most often, that the value of the information
increased with volatility, and that the optimal strategy
for an informed trader included submissions of both limit
orders and market orders. However, as Parlour and Seppi
(2008) discussed, Goettler et al.’s step forward in real-
ism came at the cost of discarding analytical tractability,
which forced them to rely solely on numerical computa-
tions.
Ros¸u (2010) also investigated how informed traders
should choose between limit orders and market orders
in a model that allowed cancellations. He showed that if
an informed trader observed a mispricing above a given
threshold, he or she should submit a market order to
capitalize on the opportunity before anyone else. If the
mispricing was below this threshold (but still positive),
the trader should instead a limit order, to gain a better
price for the trade if it matched. Ros¸u also concluded
that the price impact of a single informed trader’s or-
der submissions were insufficient to reset b(t) and a(t) to
their fundamental levels, so subsequent informed traders
who arrived at the market with the same information
were able to perform similar actions to make a profit. He
argued that this provided a possible explanation for the
empirically observed phenomenon of event clustering (see
Section IV.E.3).
Ros¸u (2009) replaced the idea that traders who selected
different prices for their orders must have done so because
of asymmetric information (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985;
Kyle, 1985) with the notion that different traders might
have selected different prices for their orders because they
valued the immediacy of trading differently. For example,
in real markets, some traders need to trade immediately
and therefore submit market orders; others do not and
can therefore submit limit orders in the hope of eventu-
ally trading at a better price. In Ros¸u’s model, traders
were able to modify and cancel their active orders in real
time, making it the first perfect-rationality LOB model
to reflect the full range of actions available. Rather than
complicating the model, Ros¸u demonstrated that limit
order cancellations simplified the decision-making prob-
lem. He proved the existence of a unique Markov-perfect
equilibrium in the game and derived the optimal strategy
for a newly arriving trader. He also showed that a hump-
shaped depth profile emerged in an LOB populated by
traders following such a strategy, in agreement with em-
pirical findings from several different markets (see Section
IV.D).
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3. Minimizing market impact
As discussed in Section IV.F, determining how to min-
imize the market impact of an order is a key considera-
tion for traders. Several perfect-rationality models have
suggested that the event clustering found in empirical
data (see Section IV.E.3) may be a signature of traders
attempting to minimize their market impact when exe-
cuting large orders (Bouchaud et al., 2009). Lillo et al.
(2005) showed that the power-law decaying autocorre-
lation function exhibited by order flows present in em-
pirical data could be reproduced by a model in which
traders who wished to buy or sell large quantities of an
asset did so by submitting a collection of smaller orders
sequentially through time.
Using a discrete-time framework, Bertsimas and Lo
(1998) derived an optimal trading strategy for a trader
who sought to minimize expected trading costs, includ-
ing those due to market impact, when processing a very
large order that had to be completed in the next k time
steps. They showed that if prices followed an arithmetic
random walk, then the trader should split the original or-
der into k equal blocks, and submit the blocks uniformly
through time. They also showed that if prices reflected
some form of exogenous information, then the optimal
strategy involved dynamically adjusting trade quantities
at each step. Almgren and Chriss (2001) derived a similar
strategy for traders who maximized the utility of trad-
ing revenues, including a penalty for uncertainty, when
executing a large order. However, both of the assump-
tions about the behaviour of prices in these models poorly
mimic the structure of empirically observed price series
(Lo and MacKinlay, 2001).
Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) considered the optimal ex-
ecution problem in continuous time. In this setup, it is
also necessary to choose optimal times, not just optimal
sizes, at which to submit orders. The authors showed
that considering the limit k →∞ of a k-period discrete-
time model did not provide a valid solution to the prob-
lem, as it led to a degenerate case where execution costs
were strategy-independent. By making several strong as-
sumptions — including that the depth profile underwent
exponential recovery in time24 back to a neutral uniform
state of n(p, t) = n(p′, t) for all prices p, p′ after the ar-
rival of a market order, Obizhaeva and Wang derived ex-
plicit optimal execution strategies and concluded that the
theoretical optimum required the submission of uncount-
ably many orders during a finite time period. Alfonsi
et al. (2010) developed the model further by removing
the assumption that the neutral state of the depth profile
24 Discussion about such recovery of the depth profile, often known
as its resiliency, has appeared in both the empirical (Biais et al.,
1995; Bouchaud et al., 2004; Potters and Bouchaud, 2003) and
modelling literatures (Foucault et al., 2005; Ros¸u, 2009).
must be uniform, although they still assumed that recov-
ery to the neutral state was exponential. They showed
that in continuous time, the optimal execution strategy
involved initially submitting a large market order to stim-
ulate new limit order submissions and then submitting
small, equally-sized market orders at a fixed rate, then
submitting another large market order at the end.
B. Zero-intelligence approaches
As noted above, most perfect-rationality models rely
on a series of auxiliary assumptions to quantify unobserv-
able parameters. Such assumptions often make it difficult
to relate perfect-rationality models real LOBs. By con-
trast, zero-intelligence models assume that order arrivals
and cancellations are directly governed by stochastic pro-
cesses. The parameters of such stochastic processes can
be estimated directly from historical data, and the statis-
tical properties of the models’ outputs can be compared
to those of real data. In this way, falsifiable hypotheses
can be formulated and tested empirically. Furthermore,
the predictive power of models can be measured by train-
ing them on a subset of available data in-sample and then
evaluating them against other data out-of-sample.
1. Model framework
Most zero-intelligence LOB models use the framework
introduced by Bak et al. (1997) to model the evolution
of L(t). Orders are modelled as particles on a one-
dimensional lattice whose locations correspond to price.
Sell orders are represented as a particle of type A and buy
orders are represented as a particle of type B (see Figure
5). Each particle corresponds to an order of size σ, so
an order of size kσ is represented by k separate particles.
When two orders of opposite type occupy the same point
on the pricing grid, an annihilation A+B → ∅ occurs.
2. Random-walk diffusion models
Bak et al. (1997) introduced the earliest class of
zero-intelligence LOB models involving particles diffus-
ing along a price lattice. Given an initial LOB state
with all A particles to the right of all B particles, they
modelled the movement of each particle along the price
lattice using a random walk. Several authors studied
such models analytically and via Monte Carlo simulation
(Bak et al., 1997; Chan et al., 2001; Eliezer and Kogan,
1998; Tang and Tian, 1999). Such work produced several
possible explanations for empirical regularities observed
in real LOB data, such as the hump-shaped depth pro-
file (see Section IV.D). However, the Bak et al. (1997)
model has since been rejected because the diffusion of
active orders across different prices is not observed in
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FIG. 5 An LOB and its corresponding representation as a
system of particles on a one-dimensional pricing lattice.
LOBs (Chakraborti et al., 2011a; Challet and Stinch-
combe, 2001; Farmer et al., 2005). Nonetheless, these
models sparked the idea that empirical regularities in
LOB data that were previously thought to be a direct
consequence of traders’ strategic actions could be repro-
duced in a zero-intelligence framework. This has subse-
quently become a central theme of zero-intelligence mod-
els throughout the literature (see, e.g., Bouchaud et al.
(2009); Farmer and Foley (2009); Farmer et al. (2005);
Smith et al. (2003)).
3. Discrete-time models
Maslov (2000) introduced a model that bore a stronger
resemblance to a real LOB than the price diffusion mod-
els discussed above. In Maslov’s model, a single trader
arrived at each discrete time step. With probability 1/2,
this trader was a buyer; otherwise, he or she was a seller.
Independently, with probability 1− r the trader submit-
ted a market order; otherwise, he or she submitted a limit
order x = (px, σ, tx) with
px =
{
p′ −K, if the trader was a buyer,
p′ +K, if the trader was a seller,
(22)
where p′ was the most recent price at which a match-
ing had occurred and K was a random variable with
a specified distribution. No cancellations or modifica-
tions to active orders were allowed. Even with only 1000
iterations and in very simple setups (such as r = 1/2
and K = 1 with probability 1; or r = 1/2 and K ∼
Uniform {1, 2, 3, 4}), the return series generated by the
model was found to exhibit heavy-tails and negative au-
tocorrelation at low lags on event-by-event timescales.
Slanina (2001) showed that the heavy-tailed return distri-
bution and negative autocorrelation remained when im-
plementing a mean-field approximation to replace track-
ing the prices of individual limit orders with that of a
mean value that increased when a limit order arrived
and decreased when a market order arrived. However,
this model generated mid-price returns with a Hurst ex-
ponent of H ≈ 0.25 on all timescales. By contrast, as
discussed in Section IV.G, LOB data displays no long
memory (i.e., H ≈ 0.5) in mid-price returns on all but
the shortest timescales (Lillo and Farmer, 2004).
Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) refined Maslov’s
model by allowing multiple particles to be deposited on
the pricing grid during a single timestep. They also al-
lowed existing particles to evaporate, corresponding to
the cancellation of an active order, although such evap-
orations were assumed to occur exogenously and inde-
pendently for each particle. Challet and Stinchcombe’s
model exhibited a heavy-tailed return distribution and
volatility clustering, and the Hurst exponent of the mid-
price return series at large timescales was H ≈ 0.5.
The authors conjectured that the evaporations in their
model (which were absent in the model of Maslov (2000))
ensured that the Hurst exponent at large timescales
matched that of empirical data.
4. Continuous-time models
The first zero-intelligence model in continuous time
was introduced by Daniels et al. (2003), who produced
a master equation for L(t) under tha assumptions that
market order arrivals, limit order arrivals, and cancella-
tions were all governed by independent Poisson processes,
and that incoming limit orders arrived at the same rate at
each relative price in the semi-infinite interval (−s(t),∞).
Smith et al. (2003) solved the master equation using a
mean-field approximation that the depths available at
neighbouring prices were independent, in the limit of in-
finitesimal tick size pi → 0. Guided by dimensional anal-
ysis, they constructed simple, closed-form estimators for
a variety of LOB properties, such as the mean spread,
mean depth available at a given price, and mid-price dif-
fusion, in terms of only the lot size σ and the Poisson
processes’ arrival rates. Monte Carlo simulations pro-
duced similar results. The model also provided possible
explanations for why some empirical properties of LOBs
varied between different markets (see Section IV). In par-
ticular, the lot size σ appeared explicitly in many of the
closed-form estimators, and there were phase transitions
between different types of market behaviour as σ varied.
Many of the assumptions made by Daniels et al. (2003)
and Smith et al. (2003) to maintain analytical tractability
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provide poor resemblance to some aspects of real LOBs.
For example, in the limit pi → 0, the only possible num-
bers of limit orders that can reside at a given price p
are 0 and 1. This destroys the notion of limit orders
queueing up at given prices and thereby removes a pri-
mary consideration for traders: when to submit an order
at the back of an existing priority queue versus when to
start a new queue at a worse price (see Section III.G).
Despite its simplifications, Farmer et al. (2005) reported
that the model performed well when tested against some
aspects of empirical data. In particular, they made pre-
dictions of the mean spread and a measure of price diffu-
sion25 for 11 stocks traded on the LSE by calibrating the
model’s parameters using historical data and then com-
pared these predictions to the real data using an ordinary
least-squares regression:
Zemp(i) = zZmod(i) + c, (23)
where Zemp(i) and Zmod(i) are the mean empirical and
model output values of statistic Z for stock i. Using
this setup, z = 1 and c = 0 correspond to a perfect
fit of the model to the data. For the mean spread, the
ordinary least-squares estimates of the parameters were
z ≈ 0.99± 0.10 and c ≈ 0.06± 0.26. For the price diffu-
sion, the ordinary least-squares estimates of the param-
eters were z = 1.33 ± 0.10 and c = 0.06 ± 0.26. Farmer
et al. (2005) used bootstrap resampling to estimate the
standard errors of the regression coefficients, because se-
rial correlations within the data invalidate the assump-
tions required to use the standard estimators (see Section
III.J.2). However, the distribution of mid-price returns
did not display heavy tails, and To´th et al. (2011) re-
ported that time series of logarithmic mid-price returns
generated by the model had a Hurst exponent H < 12
when the model’s parameters were chosen to mimic real-
istic market conditions. Both of these facts are contrary
to findings in empirical data (see Section IV.G).
Cont et al. (2010) recently introduced a variant of the
Daniels et al. (2003) and Smith et al. (2003) model, to un-
derstand how the occurrence frequency of certain events
was conditional on L(t). The model did not assume that
pi → 0, and thereby ensured that priority queues formed
at discrete points on the price lattice. Cont et al. (2010)
also removed the assumption of Daniels et al. (2003) and
Smith et al. (2003) that the relative prices of limit orders
were drawn from a uniform distribution, and replaced it
with a power-law distribution to fit better observations
from empirical data (Bouchaud et al., 2002; Cont et al.,
2010; Potters and Bouchaud, 2003; Zovko and Farmer,
25 Farmer et al. (2005) studied price diffusion by calculating the
variance vτ of the set {(m(ti + τ)−m(ti)) | i = 1, . . . , n} for
various values of τ , where {ti | i = 1, . . . , n} is the set of times at
which the mid-price changed. They then performed an ordinary
least-squares regression to estimate d in the expression vτ = dτ .
2002). Simulations of the Cont et al. (2010) model exhib-
ited the hump-shaped depth profile commonly reported
in empirical data (see Section IV). Using Laplace trans-
forms, the authors computed conditional probability dis-
tributions for the matching of limit orders in given situ-
ations.
Zhao (2010) and Toke (2011) recently extended the
Cont et al. (2010) model by revising the assumed arrival
structure of market events. Based on an empirical study
of crude oil futures traded at the International Petroleum
Exchange, Zhao (2010) rejected the assumption that the
inter-arrival times of market events were independent
draws from an exponential distribution and thereby re-
jected the use of independent Poisson processes to model
market event arrivals. Zhao replaced the independent
Poisson processes with a Hawkes process26 (Bauwens and
Hautsch, 2009) that described the arrival rate of all mar-
ket events as a function of recent order arrival rates and
of the number of recent order arrivals. When an arrival
occurred, its type (e.g., market order arrival, limit order
cancellation, etc.) was determined exogenously. This
produced order flows in which periods of high arrival
rates clustered together in time and in which periods of
low arrival rates clustered together in time, in agreement
with empirical data (Ellul et al., 2003; Hall and Hautsch,
2006). Zhao demonstrated that this improved the fit of
the model output to the empirically observed mean rel-
ative depth profile. Toke (2011) similarly replaced the
Poisson processes in the Cont et al. (2010) model with
Hawkes processes. Unlike Zhao, however, Toke used mul-
tiple mutually-exciting Hawkes processes (one for each
type of market event). By studying empirical data from
several different asset classes, Toke observed that when
a market order arrived, the mean time until the next
limit order arrival was less than the corresponding un-
conditional mean time. The Hawkes processes produced
simulated order flow and spread dynamics that matched
empirical observations more closely than those produced
by a Poisson process model.
Cont and de Larrard (2011) recently introduced a
model that tracked only nb(b(t), t) and na(a(t), t) rather
than the whole depth profile. When either became zero,
the model assumed that the depth available at the next
best price was a random variable drawn from a distribu-
tion f . The state space of this model was N2, rather than
ZP as in most other recent LOB models. The authors’
justification for such a simplified setup was that many
traders can only view the depths available at the best
prices, and not the entire depth profile (although this
is increasingly less common as electronic trading plat-
26 A Hawkes process is a point process with time-varying intensity
parameter λ(t) = λ0(t) +
∑
ti<t
∑
j Cje
−Dj(t−ti), where ti de-
notes the time of the ith previous arrivals and Cj and Dj are
parameters that control the intensity of arrivals.
28
forms deliver ever more up-to-date information in real
time (Boehmer et al., 2005; Bortoli et al., 2006)). In-
dependent Poisson processes governed market order ar-
rivals, limit order arrivals, and limit order cancellations.
Using only the Poisson processes’ rate parameters and
the distribution f , the authors derived analytical esti-
mates for several market properties — including volatil-
ity, the distribution of time until the next change in m(t),
the distribution and autocorrelation of price changes, and
the conditional probability that m(t) moved in a specified
direction given nb(b(t), t) and na(a(t), t). Different levels
of autocorrelation of the mid-price series emerged at dif-
ferent sampling frequencies, in agreement with empirical
observations (Cont, 2001; Zhou, 1996).
5. Beyond zero intelligence
To´th et al. (2011) extended the Daniels et al. (2003)
and Smith et al. (2003) model by using a long-memory
process to determine whether arriving orders were buy or
sell orders. They also introduced an extra parameter to
relate the size of arriving buy (respectively, sell) market
orders to na(a(t), t) (respectively, nb(b(t), t)). This extra
parameter made it possible to control the strength of
long memory in the logarithmic mid-price return series
generated by the model, thereby addressing an issue with
the original model.
Based on an empirical study of data from the LSE,
Mike and Farmer (2008) incorporated the empirically ob-
served long memory of order flow (see Section IV.G.3)
into their model of the evolution of L(t). They used a
Student’s t distribution to model the relative prices of
incoming orders, and they closely matched cancellation
rates for active orders to empirical data. For stocks with
small tick size and low volatility, they found that their
model exhibited negative autocorrelation of logarithmic
mid-price returns on short timescales, in agreement with
empirical data. Furthermore, they found that it made
good predictions of the distribution of mid-price returns
(including heavy tails) and of s(t). However, for stocks
other than those with small tick size and low volatility,
it was less successful.
Gu and Zhou (2009a) simulated the Mike and Farmer
(2008) model and performed a DFAm (see Section
III.J.2) on the output mid-price return and volatility se-
ries. They found that the mid-price return series did
not exhibit long memory, in agreement with empirical
data, but that neither did the volatility series. This is
in disagreement with the widely observed stylized fact
of volatility clustering (see Section IV.G). Gu and Zhou
then proposed an extension to the model in which the rel-
ative prices of orders were not drawn independently, but
rather were simulated to exhibit long memory. This mod-
ification caused long memory to emerge in the volatility
series and preserved all of the model’s other results.
Gu and Zhou (2009b) replaced several of the stochastic
processes governing order flow in the Mike and Farmer
(2008) model with other distributions to examine how
this affected the output. They concluded that a power-
law tail in the mid-price return distribution only ap-
peared in the model’s output when the distribution from
which positive relative prices were drawn had heavy tails,
irrespective of whether or not the distribution from which
negative relative prices were drawn had heavy tails.
Although To´th et al. (2011) and Mike and Farmer
(2008) did not directly assume that traders were ratio-
nal, the conditional structure of random variables in their
models can clearly be considered as consequences of ra-
tional decision-making. For example, the dependence of
market order sizes on na(a(t), t) and nb(b(t), t) in the
To´th et al. (2011) model can be interpreted as traders at-
tempting to minimize their market impact, and the lower
rate of cancellation among active orders with larger rela-
tive prices in the Mike and Farmer (2008) model can be
considered to reflect how traders would not submit such
orders unless they were willing to wait for them to be
filled in the future.
C. Agent-based models
An agent-based model (ABM) is a model in which a
large number of possibly heterogeneous agents interact
in a specified way (Gilbert, 2007). A key advantage of
ABMs is the ability to incorporate heterogeneity between
different traders (Buchanan, 2008; Chakraborti et al.,
2011a). Such models can provide insight into both the
performance of individual agents and the aggregate effect
of all agents’ interactions. By allowing each individual
agent’s behaviour to be specified without any explicit re-
quirements regarding rationality, ABMs lie between the
two extremes of zero-intelligence and perfect-rationality
models. However, ABMs of LOBs also have significant
drawbacks. Due to the large number of interacting com-
ponents in an LOB, it is difficult to track explicitly how a
specified input parameter affects the output of the ABM.
It is also very difficult to encode a quantitative set of rules
that describes traders’ complex and interacting strate-
gies, and finding a set of agent rules that produces a
specific behaviour from an ABM provides no guarantee
that such a set of rules is the only one to do so (Preis
et al., 2007). Abergel and Jedidi (2011) attempted to
address these issues by studying systems of stochastic
differential equations describing price dynamics in terms
of some ABMs’ input parameters, thereby deriving ex-
act links between the two approaches. For example, they
demonstrated that a very simple ABM resulted in Gaus-
sian process dynamics, with a diffusion coefficient that
depended on the model’s input parameters.
Early ABMs of LOBs assumed that agents arrived se-
quentially (Foucault, 1999) and that LOBs emptied at
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the end of each time step. Such setups fail to acknowledge
an LOB’s key function of storing supply and demand for
later consumption by other traders (Smith et al., 2003).
However, more recent ABMs have more closely mimicked
real LOBs and have successfully reproduced a wide range
of empirical features present in empirical data (Challet
and Stinchcombe, 2003; Chiarella and Iori, 2002; Cont
and Bouchaud, 2000; Preis et al., 2006).
Cont and Bouchaud (2000) showed that when agents
in a simple market imitated each other, the resulting
output exhibited a heavy-tailed return distribution, clus-
tered volatility, and aggregational Gaussianity (see Sec-
tion IV.G).
Chiarella and Iori (2002) studied an ABM in which all
agents shared a common valuation for the asset traded
in a given LOB. They noted that the realized volatility
produced by their model was too low compared to em-
pirical data and that there was no volatility clustering.
They thereby argued that substantial heterogeneity must
exist between traders in real LOBs in order for the highly
nontrivial properties of volatility to emerge (see Section
III.F). Cont (2005) noted that differences in agents’ lev-
els of impatience could be a source of such heterogeneity
in real markets.
Preis et al. (2006) reproduced the main findings of
Smith et al. (2003) using an ABM rather than indepen-
dent Poisson processes. By fine-tuning agents’ trading
strategies, the model reproduced the heavy-tailed distri-
bution of mid-price returns, the diffusivity of mid-price
returns over long timescales, and the negative autocorre-
lation of m(t) on an event-by-event timescale. Preis et al.
(2007) also studied the performance of individual agents
in the model. He found that the Hurst exponent H of
the mid-price return series depended on the number of
agents in the model, and that the best fit of H against
values calculated from empirical data occurred with 150
to 500 liquidity provider (i.e., limit order placing) agents
and 150 to 500 liquidity taker (i.e., market order placing)
agents.
Challet and Stinchcombe (2003) studied how allowing
the parameters of a simple ABM of an LOB to vary in
time affected the traded price series, concluding that it
resulted in the emergence of a heavy-tailed distribution
of mid-price changes, autocorrelated mid-price returns,
and volatility clustering. They noted that many LOB
models assume that parameter values remain constant in
time, and they conjectured that several stylized facts (see
Section IV.G) might be caused by real traders changing
their actions over time.
Lillo (2007) showed how an ABM could explain the
empirically observed power-law distribution of relative
prices of incoming orders (see Section IV.B). In particu-
lar, he solved a utility maximization problem to show
that if mid-price movements were assumed to follow
a Brownian motion, then each perfectly rational agent
should choose the relative price of their submitted orders
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has been examined by empirical studies discussed in this ar-
ticle.
to be
δx∗ =
√
2g−1(α)V T
1
2 , (24)
where g(α) describes the agent’s risk aversion, T is the
agent’s maximum time horizon (i.e., the maximum length
of time that the agent is willing to wait before perform-
ing the trade), and V is the market volatility. He then
studied how empirically observed homogeneity in g and T
and fluctuations in V affectted the price choices of inter-
acting agents with different risk aversions g and different
maximum time horizons T . He concluded that hetero-
geneity in T was the most likely source of the power-law
tails in the distribution of δx∗, and that the homogeneity
in g and fluctuations in V that have been observed em-
pirically in a wide range of markets were unlikely to lead
to a power-law tail in the distribution of δx∗.
VI. KEY UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS
In this section, we discuss key unresolved problems cur-
rently facing researchers of LOBs.
• Understanding statistical regularities: As dis-
cussed in Section IV, several empirical regularities
appear in data from a wide range of different mar-
kets. Some such statistical regularities describe fea-
tures of order flow or LOB state; others describe
stylized facts relevant to price formation and mar-
ket stability. Many authors (see, e.g., Gu and Zhou
(2009a); Lillo (2007); Stanley et al. (2008); To´th
et al. (2011)) agree that one of the main challenges
facing researchers of LOBs is to gain a better under-
standing the origins of these statistical regularities.
LOB models can help to achieve this, and some
progress has been made. However, no single model
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has yet been capable of simultaneously reproduc-
ing all of the statistical regularities, and there is no
clear picture about how the stylized facts emerge as
a consequence of the actions of many heterogeneous
traders.
• Understanding recent data: A great deal of ef-
fort has been invested in empirical study of LOB
data. Figure 6 shows the approximate number of
days’ data per year that studies discussed in this
article have examined. Although the breadth of
such empirical work is substantial, the overwhelm-
ing picture painted by Figure 6 is that the data
studied is old. It is also often of poor quality, so
extensive auxiliary assumptions are required before
any statistical analysis can even begin. Strong as-
sertions have been made by empirical studies based
on single stocks over very short time periods. Many
LOB models are built upon statistical regularities
observed in old data, but traders’ strategies and the
rules governing trade change over time, so empirical
observations from more than a decade ago may not
accurately describe current LOB activity. However,
recent advances in computational and storage capa-
bilities have made it feasible to record data detail-
ing all order flows at all prices, and tools have been
developed to assist researchers with reconstructing
the full LOB in certain markets (Huang and Po-
lak, 2011). By studying recent, high-quality data,
researchers will be able to assess whether the exist-
ing foundations for LOB modelling accurately re-
flect today’s markets.
• Nonstationary behaviour: Although precisely
what is meant by “equilibrium” depends upon con-
text, almost all LOB models to date have focused
on some form of equilibrium, such as a Markov-
perfect equilibrium in sequential-game models or a
state-space equilibrium in reaction-diffusion mod-
els. However, empirical evidence strongly suggests
that LOBs are subject to frequent shocks in or-
der flow that cause them to display nonstation-
ary behaviour, so they may never settle into equi-
librium (Buchanan, 2009). Preliminary work on
nonequilibrium models has hinted at promising re-
sults, such as quantitative replication of some of
the stylized facts (Challet and Stinchcombe, 2003),
but there is very little progress in this direction.
• Volatility: Price changes and volatility are among
the most hotly debated topics in the literature
(Almgren and Chriss, 2001; Bouchaud et al., 2009;
Hasbrouck, 1991; Potters and Bouchaud, 2003;
To´th et al., 2011). How can estimates of volatil-
ity be designed to incorporate information about
the entire state of L(t)? What causes volatility to
vary over time? Why should periods of high activ-
ity cluster together? Why should price fluctuations
be so frequent and so large on intra-day timescales,
given that external news events occur so rarely
(Maslov, 2000)? It is not even agreed whether
the number of market orders (Jones et al., 1994),
the size of market orders (Gallant et al., 1992), or
the fluctuation of liquidity (Bouchaud et al., 2009)
plays the dominant role in determining volatility.
It seems likely that the answers to such questions
will not be found in isolation, but rather that there
is an intricate interplay between the many pieces of
the volatility puzzle. Recent work has attempted
to tie together some of these ideas. For example,
Bouchaud et al. (2009) and Wyart et al. (2008) con-
jectured that volatility might be understood bet-
ter by considering the need for traders to minimize
their market impact.
• Algorithmic trading: Electronic trading algo-
rithms are able to process vast quantities of LOB
data to interpret market conditions and submit or
cancel orders in a small fraction of the time that
it would take a human to perform the same task.
The use of electronic trading algorithms has in-
creased rapidly in recent years, but empirical re-
search in this area is extremely difficult due to a
lack of data in which algorithmic trades are iden-
tified (Chaboud et al., 2011). To date, the pub-
lished literature on algorithmic trading consists of
only a handful of empirical studies and models,
yet there is fierce debate about whether such al-
gorithms are beneficial or detrimental to markets.
Different studies have drawn contradictory conclu-
sions. Chaboud et al. (2011) and Hendershott et al.
(2011) reported that electronic trading algorithms
narrow spreads, reduce adverse selection, speed up
price discovery, increase liquidity, and improve the
informativeness of b(t) and a(t). However, Biais
et al. (2011) and Kirilenko et al. (2011) reported
that electronic trading algorithms increase adverse
selection, create an unfair advantage for wealthier
traders, decrease liquidity, and exacerbate volatil-
ity during stressed market scenarios. From a reg-
ulatory standpoint, it is crucial to understand how
electronic trading algorithms affect market stabil-
ity, yet almost nothing concrete is currently known.
• Liquidity fragmentation: In recent years, it has
become increasingly common for assets to be traded
on several different electronic trading platforms si-
multaneously (Bennett and Wei, 2006). The result-
ing competition between exchanges has stimulated
technological innovation and driven down the fees
incurred by traders, but it has also caused a frag-
mentation of liquidity because limit orders for a
given asset are now spread between several different
LOBs. This poses a problem for empirical research,
31
as the study of any individual LOB in isolation no
longer provides a snapshot of the whole market for
an asset. Furthermore, differences between differ-
ent trading platforms’ matching rules and transac-
tion costs complicate comparisons between differ-
ent LOBs for the same asset. Cont et al. (2011)
reported similarities between different LOBs that
traded the same asset simultaneously, but there is
no reason that this must hold in general. The de-
velopment of robust methods for assimilating data
across multiple platforms will be of paramount im-
portance to understand the implications of liquidity
fragmentation on market stability and price forma-
tion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The literature on LOBs has grown rapidly, and both
empirical and theoretical work has deepened understand-
ing of the LOB trading process. LOBs are a rich and
exciting testing ground for theories, and have provided
new insight into longstanding economic questions regard-
ing market efficiency, price formation, and the rationality
of traders. However, despite the progress made on spe-
cific aspects of limit order trading, it remains unclear how
the various pieces of the puzzle fit together. For exam-
ple, models that capture the dynamics of event-by-event
price changes poorly reproduce price dynamics on longer
timescales. Similarly, models that explain price dynamics
on inter-day timescales offer little understanding of how
they emerge as the aggregate effect of individual trades.
There are substantial challenges associated with study-
ing historical LOB data, and several empirical studies
contain systematic errors in their calculations. More-
over, performing quantitative comparisons between dif-
ferent empirical studies is very difficult for two reasons.
First, it is unclear whether differences in the findings of
such studies are caused by differences in different mar-
kets, or are simply a result of differences in methodology.
Sampling frequency, choice of asset class, LOB resolution
parameters, specific trade-matching nuances, and many
other factors all influence empirical findings, but so too
do the choice of statistical estimators and the details of
their implementation. This makes it difficult to assess
the influence of specific LOB factors on trade. Second,
LOB platforms, LOB rules, and trading strategies have
all changed over time, so the date range over which data
was collected may itself play a role in the values of the
statistics reported. This issue is particularly important
given the recent surge in popularity of electronic trad-
ing algorithms. Studies of recent, high-quality LOB data
that are conducted with stringent awareness of potential
statistical pitfalls are needed to understand better the
LOBs of today.
It is clear from empirical studies how poorly the data
supports the very strong assumptions made by many
LOB models. Although every model must make assump-
tions to facilitate computation, many LOB models de-
pend on elaborate and inaccurate assumptions that make
it almost impossible to relate their output to real mar-
kets. ABMs appear to offer some compromise between
the extremes of zero-intelligence and perfect-rationality
models; they also provide an explicit way to remove the
inherent homogeneity associated with many existing ap-
proaches (Lux and Westerhoff, 2009; Toke, 2011; Zhao,
2010). Furthermore, the level of game-theoretic consid-
erations involved in agents’ decision-making can be con-
trolled by specifying how strongly agents react to each
other and forecast each other’s actions. Therefore, ABMs
have the potential to provide a rich toolbox for investigat-
ing LOBs without requiring extreme modelling assump-
tions. However, it remains unclear whether the ABMs
studied to date offer a deeper understanding of market
dynamics or merely amount to curve-fitting exercises in
which parameters are varied until some form of nontriv-
ial behaviour emerges. Recently, statistical techniques
from econometrics have enabled consistent estimation of
ABMs’ parameters from market data (Chen et al., 2012).
It will be interesting to see whether the use of such tech-
niques in an LOB context paves the way for new, quan-
titative explanations of LOB phenomena.
Price impact and market impact also continue to be ac-
tive areas of research. A deeper understanding of these
notions is very desirable, as they form a conceptual bridge
between the microeconomic mechanics of order match-
ings and the macroeconomic concepts of price formation.
Considerations about price impact and market impact
could also help to explain the actions of traders in certain
situations. However, despite the striking regularities that
have been observed in empirical studies, little is under-
stood about why price impact functions have the forms
that they do and almost nothing is understood about
market impact. However, this is a difficult task because
the state space of L(t) is so large.
LOBs have revolutionized trading by providing traders
the freedom to evaluate their own need for immediate
liquidity. Their study has hitherto been hampered by
their inherent complexity, with all the associated techni-
cal difficulties, and above all by wholly inadequate em-
pirical data. However, our growth in understanding al-
lied to massive improvements in data and in computa-
tional power suggest that answers to many important
open questions will not be long in coming.
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Appendix A: Table of Empirical Studies
Reference Assets Studied Date Range Data Type Main Points Studied
Aı¨t-Sahalia
et al. (2011)
The 30 Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average stocks
19th – 23rd and
26th – 30th Apr
2004
b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t),
na(a(t), t), and all mar-
ket orders
Volatility and long range depen-
dence in order flows
Anand et al.
(2005)
144 stocks traded on the
NYSE
Nov 1990 – Jan
1991
All order flows at all prices Decision between using limit or-
ders or market orders for informed
traders
Bandi and
Russell (2006)
All stocks in the S&P 100
index
Feb 2002 b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t),
na(a(t), t), and all mar-
ket orders
Volatility
Bennett and
Wei (2006)
39 stocks that voluntar-
ily switched their listing
from NASDAQ to the
NYSE
Jan 2002 – Mar
2003
Total size of arriving mar-
ket orders, daily returns,
s(t), and several summary
statistics describing individ-
ual assets
How liquidity fragmentation af-
fects markets
Biais et al.
(1995)
The CAC 40, traded on
the Paris Bourse
6 trading days in
Jun/Jul 1991 and
19 trading days in
Oct/Nov 1991
First 5 levels of bid-side
relative depth profile and
ask-side relative depth pro-
file (updated every time the
depth available at one of the
displayed levels changed)
Returns, percentage of market or-
ders that matched to hidden liq-
uidity, mean total depth avail-
able, and s(t) (both uncondition-
ally and dependent on time of
day), order flow (both uncondi-
tionally and dependent on recent
order flow and time of day), and
state of L(t)
Biais et al.
(1999)
The CAC 40, traded on
the Paris Bourse
19 trading days
in Oct/Nov 1991,
26 trading days
in 1993, and 234
trading days in
1995
b(t) and a(t) (sampled once
per minute)
Whether the evolution of the price
process indicates that traders
learn during the daily opening
auction
Boehmer et al.
(2005)
400 stocks traded on the
NYSE
7th – 18th Jan,
4th – 15th Feb,
4th – 15th Mar,
1st – 12th Apr,
6th – 17th May
(all in 2002)
All order flows at all prices
in the electronic LOB and
information about the han-
dling of both electronic and
manual (broker-handled)
orders
How the introduction of an elec-
tronic LOB on the NYSE affected
traders’ behaviour
Bortoli et al.
(2006)
The 4 most actively
traded futures contracts
on the Sydney Futures
Exchange
15th Sep 2000 –
19th Jun 2001
Every matching, change in
b(t) or a(t), and change in
depth available at the best
prices (respectively, best
three prices) prior to (re-
spectively, after) the change
in disseminated market
information (timestamped
to the nearest second)
Whether order flow and L(t)
changed when the Sydney Fu-
tures Exchange increased the real-
time information disseminated to
traders
Bouchaud
et al. (2002)
France Telecom, Vivendi,
and Total stocks, traded
on the Paris Bourse
Feb 2001 All order arrivals at all prices
along with their time of ar-
rival and a list of all orders
that were cancelled (but not
the time at which they were
cancelled)
Mean depths available, distri-
bution of relative prices, ωx,
nb(b(t), t), and na(a(t), t)
Bouchaud
et al. (2004)
France Telecom Stock,
traded on the Paris
Bourse (with similar
results reported for other
unnamed liquid French
and British stocks)
Jan 2001 – Dec
2002
b(t) and a(t) (recorded once
every time either of them
changed) and all market or-
ders (timestamped to the
nearest second)
How order flow affects prices
38
Cao et al.
(2008)
100 largest stocks traded
on the Australian Stock
Exchange
Mar 2000 All order arrivals and cancel-
lations at all prices (times-
tamped to the nearest 0.01
seconds)
How the state of L(t) affects order
flow
Chaboud
et al. (2011)
EUR/USD, USD/JPY,
and EUR/JPY currency
pairs on EBS
2003 – 2007 b(t) and a(t) (sampled once
per second) and total size of
arriving market orders (sam-
pled once per minute)
How electronic trading algorithms
affect markets
Chakraborti
et al. (2011b)
Four stocks traded on the
Paris Bourse
All trading days,
1st Oct 2007 –
30th May 2008
All market orders and the
five highest-priority active
orders on each side of the
LOB
Whether the traditional stylized
facts are present in the data
Challet and
Stinchcombe
(2001)
Four stocks traded on
the Island ECN (on
NASDAQ)
Not specified 15 highest-priority active or-
ders on each side of the LOB
(updated every time the list
changed)
Order flow rates, autocorrelation
of order flow rates, diffusion of ac-
tive orders (i.e., cancellation of an
active order immediately followed
by resubmission at a neighbouring
price), instantaneous price impact,
distribution of ωx, lifetime of limit
orders, and δx for incoming orders
Cont et al.
(2010)
Sky Perfect Communica-
tions stock, traded on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange
Not specified Nb(p, t) and Na(p, t) for the
five smallest relative prices
with nonzero depth avail-
able (updated whenever ei-
ther changed) and all market
orders
Arrival rates of market orders and
arrival and cancellation rates of
limit orders
Cont et al.
(2011)
50 stocks from the S&P
500, traded on the NYSE
All 21 trading
days in Apr 2010
nb(b(t), t) and na(a(t), t)
(updated whenever either
changed and timestamped
to the nearest second) and
all market orders
Relationship between order flow
imbalance and price impact
Dufour and
Engle (2000)
18 of the most frequently
traded stocks on the
NYSE
62 trading days,
1st Nov 1990 –
31st Jan 1991
b(t) and a(t)(updated when-
ever either changed) and all
market orders
Relationship between market or-
der inter-arrival times and price
impact
Eisler et al.
(2012)
14 stocks traded on
NASDAQ
3rd Mar 2008 –
19th May 2008
b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t), and
na(a(t), t)(updated when-
ever any of them changed)
Price impact of market order sub-
missions, and limit order submis-
sions and cancellations
Ellul et al.
(2003)
The 50 most actively
traded stocks and 98
other stocks on the
NYSE
30th Apr 2001 –
5th May 2001
All market order submis-
sions and all limit order sub-
missions and cancellations
(timestamped to the nearest
second)
Which factors traders assess when
choosing the price of an order
Engle and
Patton (2004)
100 stocks traded on the
NYSE
18 months of
data, no specified
date range
b(t) and a(t) (updated when-
ever either changed) and all
market orders
s(t) and how price impact varies
according to how frequently trades
occur for a specific stock
Farmer and
Lillo (2004)
3 stocks traded on the
LSE and 3 stocks traded
on the NYSE
May 2000 – Dec
2002 for the LSE
stocks and 1995
– 1996 for the
NYSE stocks
All order flows for the LSE;
b(t) and a(t) (updated when-
ever either changed) and all
market orders for the NYSE
Price impact of individual market
orders and distribution of ωx for
market orders
Farmer et al.
(2005)
11 stocks traded on the
LSE
1st Aug 1998 –
30th Apr 2000
All market order submissions
and all limit order submis-
sions and cancellations
Goodness-of-fit of the predictions
regarding mean spread and price
diffusion of the Smith et al. (2003)
model and mean instantaneous
mid-price logarithmic return im-
pact as a function of market order
size
Field and
Large (2008)
Short Sterling, Euribor,
EUR/USD, and 2-Year
US Treasury Note futures
23rd Nov – 11th
Dec 2006 and
16th – 20th Apr
2007
b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t), and
na(a(t), t) (updated when-
ever any of them changed)
Order flow rates and nb(b(t), t)
and na(a(t), t) in markets in which
s(t) = pi
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Gode and
Sunder (1993)
Laboratory experiment
with human beings
and computerized zero-
intelligence traders
N/A All order flows at all prices Relative applicability of perfect-
rationality and zero-intelligence
assumptions, and emergence
of seemingly rational behaviour
when aggregating across irrational
individuals
Gopikrishnan
et al. (2000)
1000 largest stocks
traded in the US
1994 – 1995 a(t), b(t), and all market
orders
Price impact as a function of trade
imbalance count and trade imbal-
ance size, and distribution and au-
tocorrelation of trade imbalance
count and trade imbalance size
Gu et al.
(2008a)
23 stocks traded on
the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
All of 2003 All order flows at all prices Distribution of mid-price returns
on various τ second timescales and
various event-by-event timescales
Gu et al.
(2008b)
23 stocks traded on
the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
All of 2003 All order flows at all prices Distribution of relative prices of
incoming orders and whether this
is conditional on s(t) or volatility
Gu et al.
(2008c)
23 stocks traded on
the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
All of 2003 All order flows at all prices N
b
(p), N
a
(p), and changes in rel-
ative depth profiles through time
Gu and Zhou
(2009a)
23 stocks traded on
the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
All of 2003 All order flows at all prices Autocorrelation of δx for incoming
orders
Hall and
Hautsch
(2006)
The 5 most liquid stocks
traded on the Australian
Stock Exchange
Jul – Aug 2002 All order flows at all prices Whether the distribution of δx for
incoming orders is conditional on
L(t), volatility, and recent order
flows
Harris and
Hasbrouck
(1996)
144 stocks traded on the
NYSE
Nov 1990 – Jan
1991
All order flows at all prices Analysis of performance measures
aiding decision-making between
limit orders versus market orders
Hasbrouck
and Saar
(2002)
The 300 largest equities
on NASDAQ, traded on
Island ECN
1st Oct – 31st Dec
1999
All order flows at all prices How volatility is related to order
flow and L(t), and how order fill
probabilities and mean time to ex-
ecution vary with volatility
Hautsch and
Huang (2011)
The 30 most frequently
traded stocks on Eu-
ronext Amsterdam
All trading days
between 1st Aug
and 30th Sep,
2008
First 2 levels of bid-side
relative depth profile and
ask-side relative depth pro-
file (updated whenever either
changed) and a record of all
trades (timestamped to the
nearest millisecond)
Market impact of incoming limit
orders
Hendershott
and Jones
(2005)
3 exchange-traded funds
on Island ECN
16th Aug – 31st
Oct 2002
For activity on Island: for
first part of data, b(t), a(t),
nb(b(t), t), and na(a(t), t)
(updated whenever any of
them changed), and all mar-
ket orders; for second part
of data, only market orders;
for activity not on Island,
b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t), and
na(a(t), t) (updated when-
ever any of them changed),
and all market orders for en-
tire data period
How showing traders L(t) affects
price series
Hendershott
et al. (2011)
943 stocks traded on the
NYSE
Feb 2001 – Dec
2005
b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t), and
na(a(t), t) (updated when-
ever any of them changed)
How algorithmic trading affects
L(t)
Hollifield
et al. (2004)
The Ericsson stock,
traded on the Stockholm
Stock Exchange
59 trading days,
3rd Dec 1991 –
2nd Mar 1992
All order flows at all prices Whether traders’ actions can be
explained by a cut-off strategy
based on their private valuation of
the traded asset
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Hollifield
et al. (2006)
3 stocks traded on
the Vancouver Stock
Exchange
May 1990 – Nov
1993
All order flows at all prices Distribution of traders’ personal
valuations (inferred from their
actions)
Kempf and
Korn (1999)
DAX futures contracts,
traded on the German
Futures and Options
Exchange
17th Sep 1993 –
15th Sep 1994
b(t), a(t), and all market
orders
Permanent price impact, as a
function of several measures of
trade imbalance, over 1-minute
time horizons
Kirilenko
et al. (2011)
E-mini S&P 500 index
futures contracts, traded
on the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange
6th May 2010 All order flows at all prices,
including details of which
traders submitted which
orders
Possible causes of the “Flash
Crash”
Lillo and
Farmer (2004)
20 stocks traded on the
LSE
1999 – 2002 All order flows at all prices Autocorrelations of ωx series,
m(t), nb(b(t), t), na(a(t), t), and
order type (buy or sell) for arriv-
ing LOs, arriving MOs, and can-
celled LOs
Lillo et al.
(2005)
20 stocks traded on the
LSE
May 2000 – Dec
2002
All LOB order flows and all
off-book trades for the same
stocks
Effects of order splitting and hid-
den liquidity on observed order
flows
Lillo (2007) Astrazeneca Stock,
traded on the LSE
May 2000 – Dec
2002
Order arrivals, partitioned
by who submitted them
Distribution of δx for incoming
limit orders from specified traders
Lo and Sapp
(2010)
DEM/USD and
USD/CAD currency
pairs, traded on Reuters
5th Oct – 10th
Oct 1997 for
DEM/USD; 1st
May – 30th
June 2005 for
USD/CAD
All order flows at all prices How traders choose ωx and δ
x for
their orders
Madhavan
et al. (2005)
109 stocks traded via
LOBs and 240 stocks
traded by floor traders
on the Toronto Stock
Exchange
Mar and May,
1990
For March: b(t), a(t),
na(a(t), t), and nb(b(t), t);
for May: b(t), a(t), first 5
levels of bid-side relative
depth profile and ask-side
relative depth profile; for
both months: all market
orders all floor-trader trades
How real-time disclosure of more
information about the depth pro-
file affects traders’ behaviour
Maskawa
(2007)
13 stocks traded on the
LSE
Jul – Dec 2004 All order flows at all prices Distribution of δx for incoming
limit orders, and whether this dis-
tribution is affected by the state of
L(t)
Maslov and
Mills (2001)
Cisco Systems, Broad-
com Corporation, and
JDS Uniphase Corpora-
tion stocks (traded on
NASDAQ)
30th Jun 2000 for
Cisco Systems;
3rd Jul for Broad-
com Corporation;
and 5th, 6th,
and 11th Jul for
JDS Uniphase
Corporation
b(t), a(t), first 4 levels of bid-
side relative depth profile
and ask-side relative depth
profile, and all market orders
Distribution of ωx, n
b(b(t), t),
na(a(t), t), depth profiles, and in-
stantaneous price impact
Mike and
Farmer (2008)
25 stocks traded on the
LSE
May 2000 – Dec
2002
All order flows at all prices δx for incoming orders, autocorre-
lation of order type in order flows,
and order cancellations
Mizrach
(2008)
The 4 largest stocks
on NASDAQ; 95 of the
NASDAQ 100 stocks;
and 87 other smaller
NASDAQ stocks
Dec 2002 All order flows at all prices How L(t) affects the next change
in b(t) or a(t)
Mu et al.
(2009)
22 stocks traded on
the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
All of 2003 All order flows at all prices Distribution of ωx for market
orders
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Mu and Zhou
(2010)
978 stocks traded on
the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
Jan 2004 – Jun
2006
b(t) and a(t) (updated once
every 6 – 8 seconds)
Distribution of mid-price logarith-
mic returns for stocks in emerging
markets, and how this varies with
time window and market capital-
ization of the studied asset
Plerou et al.
(2002)
The 116 most frequently
traded US stocks
1994 – 1995 b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t),
na(a(t), t), and all mar-
ket orders
Price impact as a function of trade
imbalance count and trade imbal-
ance size over a variety of time
horizons
Plerou and
Stanley (2008)
1000 major US stocks;
85 of the FTSE 100
stocks, traded on the
LSE; 13 of the CAC
40 stocks, traded on the
Paris Bourse; 422 stocks
from the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices
(CRSP)
1994 – 1995 for
US stocks; 2001
– 2002 for LSE
stocks; 3rd Jan
1995 – 22nd Oct
1999 for Paris
Bourse stocks;
Jan 1962 – Dec
1996 for CRSP
database stocks
All market orders Distribution of mid-price returns
and number of arriving market or-
ders, and whether they vary ac-
cording to market capitalization
or industry sector, on various τ -
second timescales
Potters and
Bouchaud
(2003)
Exchange-traded funds
that track NASDAQ and
the S&P 500, and the
Microsoft stock
1st Jun – 15th
Jul, 2002
All order flows at all prices Distribution of δx for arriving or-
ders, relative depth profiles, ar-
rival and cancellation rates, and
instantaneous price impact
Ranaldo
(2004)
15 stocks traded on the
Swiss Stock Exchange
Mar and Apr 1997 b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t),
na(a(t), t), and all mar-
ket orders
How volatility, recent order flow,
and the state of L(t) affect order
flow, intra-day patterns in s(t) and
volatility, symmetry between the
buy side and sell side
Sand˚as (2001) 10 stocks traded on
the Stockholm Stock
Exchange
3rd Dec 1991 –
2nd Mar 1992
All order flows at all prices Whether the depth profile sup-
ports hypotheses about how
traders make decisions re-
lated to order submissions and
cancellations
Toke (2011) 3 stocks from the CAC
40, 3 month Euribor fu-
tures, and FTSE 100
futures
10th Sep 2009 –
30th Sep 2009
First 5 levels of bid-side
relative depth profile and
ask-side relative depth
profile (updated whenever
any of them changed and
timestamped to the nearest
millisecond)
Whether Hawkes processes pro-
vide a better explanation of order
flows than do Poisson processes
To´th et al.
(2011)
500,000 trades on a vari-
ety of futures contracts
Jun 2007 – Dec
2010
Changes in b(t) and a(t) Price impact
Wyart et al.
(2008)
The 68 most liquid
stocks on the Paris
Bourse, small tick index
futures contracts, and
the 155 most actively
traded stocks on the
NYSE
2002 for the Paris
Bourse and 2005
for the small
tick futures and
NYSE stocks
b(t), a(t), nb(b(t), t) and
na(a(t), t), and all market
orders
Price impact and how the profit of
a market maker trading in an LOB
depends on s(t)
Zhao (2010) Crude oil futures con-
tracts, traded on the
International Petroleum
Exchange
17th Oct 2005 First 5 levels of bid-side
relative depth profile and
ask-side relative depth pro-
file (updated whenever ei-
ther changed) and all market
orders (timestamped to the
nearest second)
Order flow rates
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Zhou (1996) DEM/USD, USD/JPY
and DEM/JPY currency
pairs, traded on Reuters
1st Oct 1992 –
30th Sep 1993
b(t) Volatility
Zhou (2012) 23 stocks traded on
the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (although 1
is later removed, as its
price was reported to be
manipulated in the data)
All of 2003 All order flows at all prices Instantaneous price impact of in-
dividual orders
